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Fiscal  and  labor  market  reforms  are  at  the  forefront  of the policy  agenda
in many  developing  countries,  and  assessing their  effects on unemployment
and poverty  is a key issue in the  design and sequencing  of adjustment  pro-
grams.  In turn,  assessing these effects  requires understanding  not  only how
the labor market operates,  but  also how fiscal  variables  (taxes and expendi-
ture)  interact with the labor market.  Because  most taxes  have an effect  on
the  functioning  of the  economy,  they  also affect the labor market,  both di-
rectly and indirectly,  through changes  in the level  and distribution of wages,
labor  supply  decisions,  and the  level  and  composition  of employment.  For
instance,  taxing the profits of small firms  (which tend to be more labor  in-
tensive)  may affect their ability to create jobs, whereas  income taxation and
the existence  of an  unemployment  benefit system  may  affect the propensity
of the unemployed  to seek  employment.  Payroll  taxes  (such  as  employers'
social security  contributions)  raise the effective  cost of labor over and above
the wage paid, thereby  affecting the demand for labor, whereas  income taxes
and  employees'  social security contributions  reduce the return to being  em-
ployed,  thereby  affecting the decision to enter  (or remain in) the labor force
and possibly to invest in the acquisition of skills.'  In addition to influencing
the decision to enter into (or exit from) the labor force,  changes in taxation
may  also  affect  the  decision  to engage  in part-time  work.  Similarly,  taxes
on  goods  and services  may  affect  the purchasing  power  of wages,  and  thus
the decision to seek formal  employment.  High  tax rates  on income  and  ac-
tivities  in the  formal  economy  may  also  drive  firms  underground,  thereby
impeding an efficient allocation  of resources,  with adverse effects on employ-
ment  and poverty.  Indeed,  as  shown  in Figure  1, in  developing  economies
the overall tax ratio  (in proportion of GDP), as well as the direct income tax
ratio,  seem to be positively correlated  with the size of the informal economy,
and  thus  with  "disguised"  unemployment.2 To the  extent  that the urban
lAs  is  well  known,  changes  in  income  taxes  affect  labor  supply  and  leisure  choices
through  both  substitution  and  income  effects.  Because  these  effects  tend  generally  to
operate  in opposite  direction,  the  net effect  of a change in the income  tax on the supply
of labor is  a priorz ambiguous.
2At a more formal  level, Loayza (1996),  Johnson,  Kaufman,  and Zoido-Lobaton  (1998),
Schneider  and  Enste  (2000),  Ihrig  and  Moe  (2000)  and  Dessy  and  Pallage  (2003),  have
also  found that  a higher tax burden  tends  to be correlated  with a larger  informal  sector.
By contrast, there does not appear to be a simple correlation between  the overall tax ratio
and open unemployment.
3poor tend to be concentrated  in the infermal sector  (as illustratea-  in Figure
2),  taxation  could be positively  correlated  with poverty.  But of course,  the
taxation-poverty  correlation  could  also be  weak or  non existent,  because  it
also  depends  on the use  of tax proceeds-namely,  whether  taxes  serve  to
finance  expenditure  on the poor,  public  spending on infrastructuere  (which
indirectly affect the poor through a comrplementarity  effect on private invest-
ment and thus labor demand),  or are simply wasted on inefficient  projects.
Labor market distortions,  and the  RiLks between  taxation  and the labor
market,  have  received limited attention in quantitative,  general equilibrium
models that have often been used for development  policy analyss.  The pir-
pose of this paper  is to  present  a quantitative  framework  that accourt  for
many of these distortions and linkages,  and that modelers and pol'icy econo-
mists in developing  countries can use to assess the effects  of fiscal  and labor
market  reforms on unemployment and poverty.  TL  his framework, called Mini-
TMIPA, is  a specialized,  and  less-data intensive,  version  of the  `:htegrated
Macroeconomic  Model for Poverty Analysis  (¶MMPA)  developed  by Ag6nor,
lzquierdo  and Fofack  (2003),  and  Ag6nor,  Fernandes,  Haddad  arod  van der
Mensbrugghe  (2003).  Although  Mini-IMMPA  focuses  only  on  -he  "real"
side,  it  offers  a more detailed  treatment  of the  labor market  than  _MMPA
(by  accounting  for  features  such  as  bilateral  wage  bargaining,  Eree  public
education,  employment  subsidies,  and job security  provisions)  ard the tax
structure.  The resulting  framework  allows  the user to analyze  a  variety  of
important policy issues, such as for instance the trade-offs involved in,  shifting
the tax burden  away  from unskilled  labor  in the  formal sector  ad  toward
other tax bases.
The remainder  of the paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section
describes  in  detail  the structure  of  Mini-IIMMPA,  considering  in turn the
production  structure,  the  labor  market,  supply  and  demand  of  coxmmodi-
ties,  external  trade,  prices,  profits  and  income,  private  consumption  and
savings, private  investment,  the public sC-ctor,  and the balance  of payments.
The  description  of the labor  is particularly  detailed,  given the  _,_portaance
of government-induced  labor market  distortions  in  developing  countries.  7
account,  in particular,  for the existence  of firing costs  in the forreal  sector.
Such  costs  tend  to benefit  the  employed  (or  "insiders")  by  lowering  their
probability of losing their job and increasing their bargaining power in wage
determination,  and to  make  firms  reluctant  to both  hire and fre workers,
thereby  raising the  duration  (if not  the  level)  of unemployment  (lindbeck
and  Snower  (2001)).  Section  II1  presents  and  discusses  the results  of two
4policy simulations:  a cut in the minimum wage,  and a reduction  in payroll
taxes  on  unskilled  labor  (assuming  both  neutral  and  non-neutral  revenue
effects).  The payroll  tax experiment  is of particular  interest  in light of the
previous discussion emphasizing the links between fiscal and labor market re-
forms.  As it turns out, the unemployment  and poverty  effects  of this policy
change  depend importantly  on whether or not it is offset  by other  changes
in sources  of revenue,  and  what  the  precise  nature  of that source  is.  The
last section summarizes the main results of the analysis and suggests various
extensions.  Appendices  A,  B  and  C provide  a summary  list of the model's
equations,  variable  names  and parameters,  as  well  as  a  description  of the
calibration procedure.
2  Structure of Mini-IMMPA
The building blocks  of the "structural"  components  of mini-IMMPA  consist
of the production  structure,  the labor market,  the supply  and demand  for
goods and services,  external trade, sectoral and aggregate  prices,  profits and
income formation,  private consumption  and savings, private investment, the
public sector,  and the balance of payments.  The link between the structural
component and a (fictitious) household income and expenditure survey, which
is necessary for poverty and distributional analysis,  is also explained later on.
2.1  Production
The  basic distinction  on the production  side  is that between rural  and ur-
ban sectors.  In the rural economy  (or agriculture)  firms  produces one good
(referred to as good  1),  which  is sold domestically  or exported.  The urban
economy  consists  of both formal  and informal  components.  The  informal
economy produces  nontraded  services  (referred  to as good 2).  in the formal
urban economy production  consists  of a private good (referred to as good  3)
and a nontraded public good  (referred to as good 4).
2.1.1  Rural Production
Land available for rural activities is assumed to be non marketed and in fixed
supply.  Gross output of the agricultural good,  Xi, is the sum of value added,
5V1, and intermediate  consumption:
4
Xi  = V1 +  7ajlXl,  (1)
i=l,
where the a,, are input-output  coefficients  measuring relative sales from sec-
tor i to sector j.
Value  added  is  produced  with  a  Cobb-Douglas  finction of  1and  and  a
composite factor, defined as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)  func-
tion of the number  of unskilled workers  employed in the sector,  Ul,  and the
economy-wide  stock of public physical capital  (K 0,  defined below).  Normal-
izing the area of land allocated to production to unity yields
Vt 1 =  [&!X 1 {,6xiul1  +  (1  - ,i3x)GPx  1}  PxlJ  (2)
where 0  <  71X  < 1, and the other parameters  have the standard interpreta-
tion.  Given the Cobb-Douglas specification,  agricultural production exhibits
decreasing returns to scale in the composite input.  The presence of KG in (2)
is  based on the view that a greater  availability  of public  physical  capital in
the economy  (roads, power plants, and the like)  improves the productivity  of
all production  units in the rural sector,  because it facilitates  not only trade
but also production  itself.
Firms  in  the rural  sector  allocate  their  output  to  exports,  E1,  or  the
domestic  market,  D1,  according  to a  constant  elasticity  of tran-foi0rmation
(CET)  function:
1 =  aEDj[/EDlEl  1  + (-3ED1  )DED  )JPED 1 (3)
with the ratio ratio E 1/D 1 depending,  as shown below,  on the relative prices
of exported  and domestic goods.
So12  oUJrba  lEcnfirmal  Rroluctnon
Gross production  in the urban informal  sector,  X 2,  is given also  as the sum
of value added,  V2,  and intermediate consumption:
4
X  =  2 +  a% 2X2 - (4)
6There is no physical capital in the informal sector, and production requires
only  unskilled  labor.  Assuming  decreasing  returns  to  scale,  value  added
can thus be written  solely as  a function  of the number  of unskilled  workers
employed in the informal  economy,  U2:
V2 = U2  ,  ° <  X2  <1.  (5)
FRom  (5),  the demand  for labor in the informal  sector is given by
U2  = 71x2(V 2/w 2),  (6)
where  W2  =  W2/PV2 is  the product  wage,  with  W2 the  nominal wage  and
PV2 the price of value added in the informal  sector  (defined below).
2.1.3  Urban Formal Private Production
Gross  production of the private formal urban sector, X 3, is once  again taken
to be given by the sum of value added,  V3, and intermediate  consumption:
V  4
X3  = V3 +  a3X3. (7)
i
Private formal  production uses  as inputs both skilled and unskilled labor,
as well as physical capital.  Skilled labor and private  physical capital are  as-
sumed,  in line with the evidence discussed  in Agenor (2000)  and Hamermesh
(1993),  to have a higher degree of complementarity-that  is,  a lower  degree
of substitution-than  physical  capital and  unskilled labor.  In  order  to ac-
count for these differences  in the degree  of substitutability  among  inputs,  a
nested CES production structure is adopted.  Specifically,  at the lowest level
of factor  combination, skilled labor,  S3,  and private physical capital,  K3, are
combined to form the composite  input  JL, with a relatively  low elasticity of
substitution  (as  measured by  CYX3L  =  1/(1 + PX3L))  between them:
JL(S3, K3)  = aX3 L[ 3X3LS 3 3  +  (1 - 3X 3 L)K 3 PX3L.  (8)
At the second level, this composite input is used together with unskilled
labor,  U3, to form the composite input  JH:
JH(JL, U3)  =  aX 3H{3X,H JL  x  +  (1 -/ 3X3H)U3  PX3H  . (9)
7The elasticity of substitution between  JL and unskilled workers,  zrneasured
by 
0 X3H  =  1/(l+Px 3H),  is taken to be Egher than between S3 and K3, that
is
UX3 H  > 
0X 3H-
The final layer combines  JH and KG (the stock of government  capital)  as
production inputs, with public capital subject to congestion  effects:
V3(JH, KG) = aX3 [3X3 JH  _  (1  X3){ URBdc3 }PX 3 X  (10)
where URB is the size of the urban population  (defined below),  EaM  dc3 > 0.
The  presence  of the term  KG/URB  in  this  equation  can  be  exulained  as
follows (see Ag6nor  (2003b)).  As in agriculture,  public physical capital has a
positive impact on the productivity of production factors in the ufcan private
sector.  However,  this positive effect  is now subject to  congestion effects.  As
long as  dc3 > 0,  the positive  externality  of  public  capital  decreases  as  its
usage  by the urban population  increases,  that  is, the larger the size  of the
urban population, the lower is the contribution of the public capital stock to
private urban production.
Private firms in the urban formal sector allocate their output to exports,
E3, or the domestic market,  D3, according to a production possibility frontier,
again defined by a CET function:
X  3  =ED3 P[ED3 E
3 +  (  - ED3 )D3  3] PED3.  (11)
As shown later, the ratio E 3/D 3 depends on the relative prices or exported
and domestic  goods.
MO14d  Production of the pubRic  good
Gross production of the public good, X4, is given by the sum of value added,
V4, and intermediate  consumption:
X4 = 4 +  E7a 1 4X4- (12)
8=Value  added  in the public  sector  is  measured  by the government  wage
bill, as in national accounts:
V4 =  (WUGU4 +  WSGS4)/PV4. (13)
where  S4 and  U4 (respectively  WSG  and  WUG)  denote  employment  levels
(respectively  wages)  of skilled  and  unskilled  workers  in  government.  Em-
ployment  levels are treated  as predetermined policy variables,  whereas  wage
formation is discussed  below.
2.2  The Labor Market
As noted earlier,  there are two categories  of workers  in the economy,  skilled
and unskilled.  Unskilled workers  may be employed either in the rural econ-
omy or in the urban  economy,  whereas  skilled workers  are employed  only in
the urban  economy.  As discussed  later,  skilled workers  have a high reserva-
tion wage  and therefore  do not  seek employment  in the informal  economy,
even when they are unable to find a job in the formal  sector.
In addition to accounting  for various  sources of labor market  segmenta-
tion (a pervasive feature  of the labor market in developing countries),  Mini-
IMMPA  accounts for the existence  of employment  protection regulations,  an
important component  of which being state-mandated  firing costs.  Indeed,  in
many of developing  countries,  severance  payments  tend to be a partial sub-
stitute to unemployment  insurance  benefits.  An important  issue is whether
these  costs  contribute  to  a  high  level  of  unemployment  and  to  its  degree
of persistence-perhaps  by reducing employment  variation over the business
cycle,  as argued  by Bertola (1990).3  A general conclusion  of the literature is
that firing  costs affect  employment  dynamics  more than the average level of
employment;  unemployment  tends to be more persistent in countries  charac-
terized by  high job security provisions,  because mandatory  firing costs play
a stabilizing effect  on aggregate employment.  On the one hand,  firing costs
3Bertola's  analysis  assumes  that  workers  are  risk-neutral.  But  as  noted  by  Booth
(1999),  typically most workers  derive their income from employment,  and it is difficult for
most  of them to  diversify  across  jobs;  it seems  therefore  more plausible  to  assume  that
workers  are  risk averse.  She  also  considers  the  case in which  firms  and workers  bargain
about both wages and the size of redundancy  payments.  However,  these modifications do
not change  Bertola's  main result, which  is that firing  costs tend to  stabilize  employment
over the business  cycle.
9prevent  workers  from  losing their jobs  (thereby preventing  the loss  of firm-
specific  human  capital if downturns  are temporary);  but on the other,  they
discourage new hires.4 They also tend to increase the incidence of temporary
employment  contracts, as noted by Betcherman, Luinstra, and Ogawa (2001),
Heckman  and Pages  (2000),  and Lindauer  (1999).5  In what follows the effect
of firing costs  on both  employment  and  wage formation  is captured  under
the assumption that workers  (or the trade union that represents them) inter-
nalize,  while bargaining  with employers, the value of the severance payment
that they would receive in the event of dismissal.
2.2.1  Rural Wages and Employment
The demand for labor in agriculture,  Ul,  is derived in standard fashion from
the first-order  condition for profit maximization and is given by
( 1 +P  1-  +1  __
Ud =  5,  . Px}  (14)
I  ~  ~  WI  ax1 
where  w,  = W 1/PV1 is  the product  wage  in  agriculture,  W1 the  nominal
wage,  and PV1  the net output price (determined  below).
The nominal wage in agriculture,  W1,  adjusts to clear  the labor market.
With  UR representing labor supply in agriculture,  the equilibrium  condition
of the labor market  is thus  given by
U  =RU6  1  ,PV  )  (15)
The  supply  of labor  in  the rural  sector  is  predetermined  at  any  given
point in time, but grows over time at the exogenous rural population growth
rate,  9R,  net of worker migration to urban  areas,  MIG:
UR= UR- 1(l +gR)-MIG.  (16)
4'As shown by Gavin (1986),  the impact of firing costs on labor demand depends not only
on the size of the required severance payments and the wage elasticity of labor demand, but
also on the variability and persistence  of shocks to labor demand,  and the firm's discount
rate.
5For  some  evidence  on the  effects  of job security  regulations,  see  Fallon  and  Lucas
(1993),  Kugler  (2000),  Dabalen  (2002),  and Besley and Burgess  (2002).
10Following Harris and Todaro  (1970), the incentives to migrate are taken to
depend negatively on the ratio of the average expected consumption wage in
rural areas to that prevailing in urban areas.  Unskilled workers  in the urban
economy may be employed  either in the private formal sector, in which case
they are paid a minimum wage, WM,  or they can enter the informal  economy
and receive the average  income in that sector  (before transfers),  ym .6 When
rural workers make the decision to migrate to urban areas, they are uncertain
as to which type  of job they will be  able to get,  and therefore  weigh wages
in  each  sector  by  the  probability  of  finding  a job  in  that  sector.  These
probabilities  are  approximated  by  prevailing  employment  ratios.  Finally,
potential  migrants  also  consider  what  their  expected  purchasing  power  in
rural and urban areas  is likely to be, depending on whether they stay in the
rural sector and consume the "typical"  basket of goods  of rural households,
or migrate and consume the  "typical"  urban basket  of goods.
The expected,  unskilled urban real  wage,  wl,  is thus a weighted  average
of the minimum wage in the formal sector and the going wage in the informal
sector,  deflated by the urban consumption  price index for unskilled  workers,
Puu  (defined below):
e  OUWM,_1  +  (1-  OU)Y2-I  (17)
u  P~~UU,-1
where Ou  is the probability of finding a job in the urban formal sector, mea-
sured  by the proportion  of unskilled  workers  in the private  formal sector,
relative to the total number  of unskilled  urban workers  (net of government
employment)  looking  for a job,  UF  - U4, in the previous  period:
_u  U3,-1 (18)
A similar  reasoning is used to calculate  the expected  rural consumption
real  wage,  wA.  Here  the employment  probability  is equal to unity,  because
workers can  always find a job at the going wage.  Assuming a one-period  lag
yields
6As discussed below, there is no job turnover for either category of workers in the public
sector.  Given that, as discussed below, households in the informal sector receive all profits
from  production,  average  income  is  a better  measure  of expected  income  in that  sector
than the going wage.where PR is  the rural  consumption  price  index (defined  below).
The migration function is therefore  specified as
MIG  =  (WC 
M (19e)
UR,-1  0WA  (
where am >  0 measures  the  elasticity of (relative)  migration  flows with re-
spect  to  expected  wages.  Note  that  the  evidence  suggests  that  there  are
several  factors,  in addition  to wage  differentials,  that affect  rural-to-urban
migration.  The family,  in particular,  appears to play  a particula-ly  impor-
tant  role  in explaining  migration  by  individuals  (Lucas  (1997))  as  well  as
cash-seeking behavior,  which trarslates into a positive impact  of the compo-
sition or rural income,  in addition to its level  (Velenchik  (1994)).  Moreover,
if workers are risk averse,  they  may reouire  a greater  wage premJi-m for ur-
ban employment  than the one implied by the observed  wage dife:ential, to
compensate them for the risk of being unemployed.  However,  some of these
considerations  are difficult to integrate in the type of models considered here.
2.2.2  UJrban  Unskilled  Wages9 =Royrxeznt,  and Unez2syrnent
Both the government  and private firms in the formal and informal urban sec-
tors use unskilled labor in production.  The public sector hires an exogenous
level  of unskilled  workers,  U4,  at the nominal  wage  TWUG,  whereas  the  de-
mand for unskilled labor by the formal  private sector is deterzcine- ( by firms'
profit  maximization subject  to t'he giver minimrm wage,  WM.7 3oth  WVUG
and  WM  are assumed to be indexed on tae price of the consumption basket
for urban unskilled households,  Puu  (defined  below):
Wt  =wsP~Uut  i=UG,  M,  (20)
where  w1 is  the real  wage  and  0 <  idx,  < J tshe  indexation  parameter.  In
order to avoid corner solutions, the wage rate paid to unskilled labor in the
formal urban  sector is  assumed to  be systematicaUy  greater than the wage
rate paid in the informal sector.  Consequently, unskilled workers in the urban
area will  always seek employment  in the porivate formal sector first.
7The assumption  that  the minimum  wage  is binding  in the  formal  sectoz  is  actually
a source of debate;  see  for instance  Dabalen  (2000)  for a review of the  evidence for  sub-
Saharan  Africa.  However, what is needed  is that the distribution of unskIilled  wages shifts
as a result of a change in the minimium wage.
12Firms  also  pay  a  payroll  tax,  at  the rate  0  < ptxu  <  1 for  unskilled
workers,  which is  proportional  to the wage bill,  WMU3;  and they receive  a
nominal  employment  subsidy on unskilled labor of ESu  < WM  per worker.
Using  (9),  unskilled labor demand by the private sector is thus given by
J  a~~~~~X 3 H
U~~=JH((l±  13 H  X3H
H (1  + ptxu)WM-ESu  a  PX3 H  )  (21)
X3H
In addition,  mobility of the unskilled labor force between the formal and
the informal sectors is assumed to be imperfect and determined by expected
income  opportunities.  Specifically,  the total  supply of unskilled  workers  in
the formal  sector  (including  public  sector  workers),  UF, is taken  to change
over time as a function of the expected wage differential across sectors.  Wage
and employment  prospects  are formed  on the basis of prevailing  conditions
in the labor market.  Because there  is no job turnover  in the public  sector,
the expected  real wage in the formal  economy,  we,  is equal to the real min-
imum wage  (measured  in terms  of the price  of the consumption  basket  for
unskilled workers)  weighted  by the probability  of being  hired in the private
sector.  Assuming that hiring in that sector is random, this probability can be
approximated by the ratio of employed workers to those seeking employment.
Assuming a one-period lag,
we  U3,_1  WM)I  I 
The expected real wage in the informal economy is simply the average real
income in that sector  (measured  again in terms of the relevant consumption
price index),  because there are no barriers to entry in that sector.  Assuming
again a one-period  lag,
e  Y27-1
WI  =  t1
The flow  supply  of  unskilled  workers  in the formal  sector  thus  evolves
over time according  to
UF,I  (  F  m  ,  F  > O,  (22) LI  T;  \P1  UU,  1 Y 2, 1 3
13where oF denotes the elasticity of labor flows with respect to the (expected)
wage ratio.  The rate of unskilled unemp.-oyment in the formal sector,  UNEU,
is thus given by
UNEu=-  (U  +  U4)  (23)
UsF
where  U3  +  U4 is total unskilled formal employment.
The supply of labor in the informal economy,  U2,  is given by
UV  = Uu-UF  (24)
The informal  labor market  clears continuously,  so that  U2  =  U2.  rom
this condition and equation  (6), the equilibrium  nominal wage  is thus given
by
W2  =  72X,  (  2s  )  x~  DY2,7  (25)
where  y2j  is average  income  (before trarsfers)  in the informal  economy.
The supply of unskilled labor in the urban sector,  Ut,  grows as a result of
"natural"  urban population growth and  nigration of unskilled labor from the
rural economy,  as discussed earlier.  Moreover,  some urban unskiled workers,
SKL, acquire skills and leave the unskilled labor force to augment the supply
of qualified labor.  All individuals  are born unskilled, and thus naeLural  urban
population growth (not resulting from migration or skills acquisition  factors)
is represented by urban unskilled  population  growth  only,  at the exogenous
rate gu.  Thus, the urban unskilled labor supply evolves  according to
UU =  Uu- 1 (1 + gu) +  MIG  - SKL.  (26)
2.2.3  Urban  SkiRned  Wages and Empoymet
As noted earlier, the employment  levels of both skilled and unskil.ed workers
in the public (urban) sector are taken as exogenous; the lack of tuznover is in
part due to the fact that working for the government provides a nonpecuniary
benefit, which takes the form of greater job security.  The real wage rate that
skilled workers receive in the public sector, WSG, is also taken as g;ven.  With
WSG  denoting the  nominal  wage,  and Pus the consumption  price index  for
urban skilled workers (defined  below),  full indexation therefore  implies that
WSG  =  WSGPUS.  (27)
14From  (8),  the  demand  for skilled  labor  is,  noting that  PX3LX3L  =1
O'X3L:
PJJ  L  X3r  JL  1-X 3 L  OJX 3L
S3 =  W{  L  LX  L }JL  AX  3 PX3L  (28)
k')I~~~A  3L)  LV~~~~~ ~  X3 L)
Two alternative specifications  are used for determining wages  for skilled
labor in the private sector, Ws.  The first approach is based on the "monopoly
union"  framework, and is derived as follows (see, for instance, Agenor  (1999),
Devarajan,  Ghanem,  and  Thierfelder  (1997),  and  Thierfelder  and  Shiells
(1997)).  Let  w'  denote  the  consumption real  wage,  that  is,  the  nominal
wage earned by skilled workers  deflated by the cost-of-living  index that these
workers face in the urban sector, Pus. A centralized  labor union sets wl  with
the objective to  maximize  a utility  function that  depends on deviations  of
both  employment  and the  consumption  wage  from their  target  levels,  sub-
ject  to the  firm's  labor  demand  schedule.8 Specifically,  the union's  utility
function is given by
U  (WC  WCT)(S3  -=S3  I  O <  V  <  1,
where S3  is given by equation  (28).  The quantities w'T  and S3T  measure the
union's wage  and  employment  targets,  respectively,  and are both  assumed
predetermined  with respect to wc.  The parameter  v reflects  the relative im-
portance that the union attaches to wage deviations  from target,  as opposed
to employment  deviations.  The union's problem  is thus
maxU =  (wM  - wAT)v(sd  _  ST)l-V.
8Alternatively,  one could assume that firms and the union bargain over wages (through
a generalized  Nash  bargaining  process),  with either  firms determining  employment  (the
so-called  "right to manage"  approach) or that firms and the union bargain over  both wages
and employment.  In the former case, the firm and the union would determine ws by max-
imization  of the product of each party's gains from reaching  a bargain,  weighted  by their
respective  bargaining strengths,  and once wages are set, employment would be determined
by the firm.  As  shown by Creedy and  McDonald  (1991),  for wage determination,  it does
not  make much difference  whether  bargaining  is over  wages only,  or over  wages  and em-
ployment.  However,  as  is  well  known  (see  for  instance  Booth  (1995)),  the equilibrium
outcome  in the case  of bargaining  over  both  wages  and  employment  is  such  that firms
would not  in general be on their labor demand schedule.
15Using  (28),  the first-order  condition is given by
v  S3  -S3T  S3d  ST  1 3
c  CT  ~;~--.T  d  X 3L(  )C, lwcs  WsT  s  WWs-S  3  3XWs 
or equivalently
S3_  -_S  _  (I  -1V)OxLSd
WUs  - VSl  Ws  -
Solving this condition yields
Ws-WCs  ^  33 _  3S =  r  3
Ws  (  -V)O'X 3 L  S3  X
which indicates that percentage  deviations of the optimal wage from its target
value  are  linearly related  to percentage  differences  of employment  from  its
target  level.
The union's target real wage, wT,  is assumed to be related pcsitively to
skilled  wages  in the public sector  (meast,red  in  terms  of the relevant  price
index),  WSG,  and negatively  to the  skilled unemployment  rabe,  UiVEs,  and
the real firing cost per skilled worker,  fs, measured  in terxns of the price  of
valued added in the private formal sector,  PV3 (defined below).  Wage-setting
in the public sector is assumed to play a signaling role for wage setters in the
rest of the economy.  When unemployment  is high, the probability of finding
a job (at any given wage) is low.  Consequently,  the hig;her the une=ploymnent
rate, the greater the incentive for tahe uion to moderate its wage deman6s in
order to induce firms to increase employment.  As noted earlier, firing costs do
prevent excessive job losses in bad times (thereby preventing the loss of firm-
specific human capital if downturns are temporary)  but they also discourage
new hires-namely because reversing  mismatches  is costly if workers  prove to
be inadequate  matches  with their job requirements.  The union katernalizes
the disincentive  effect  of severance  payments on labor demand.  As a result,
the higher the firing cost, the greater the incentive for the -Lmion to  -reduce its
wage demands,  in order  to encourage  fErrs  to hire.  Normalizing  tI-e target
level  of employment  to  zero  (S3T  =  0)  the  above  expression  ca7  thus  be
rewritten as
S  = Pus UNE-'  f024G  (29)
6-  V/(  -
16where UNEs is defined  below  and the  0,  coefficients  are  all  positive.  This
equation  implies,  in particular,  that a higher level  of unemployment  lowers
the level  of wages,  as predicted by various  efficiency wage theories.'
The second approach to determining skilled wages assumes direct bargain-
ing,  in each  period,  between  producers and  workers  over  the product  wage,
WS5  = Ws/PL.  If a bargain  is reached,  each worker  receives  ws =  WS/PJL,
whereas  the producer receives ms - ws, where ms  =  &JL(S3, K 3)/0S3 is the
marginal  product of the worker,  given by  (using equation (8)):
ms - (O 3 X  L )(JL  1+X  3L  (30)
aXL
The worker's  "fallback"  position  is denoted Qs, which may represent  an
unemployment  benefit (if one exists).  The firm's fallback position is assumed
to depend on firing costs in the following way  (see Coe  and Snower  (1997)).
In case of bargaining  disagreement,  the worker  engages  in industrial  action
that is  costly  to the firm  (but  not  to himself).  The  greater  is the  level of
industrial  action,  the lower will be the producer's fallback position and thus
the higher will be the wage that the worker can achieve, up to a limit, beyond
which  the firm  has an incentive  to fire him.  Producers  face  a firing  cost of
fs per worker  (measured  now in terms  of the price  of the composite output
JL, that is,  PL),  and for simplicity  all workers become  eligible for severance
payments immediately  upon hiring.' 0 If the cost of the industrial action to
the  firm exceeds  the firing  cost  fs, the  worker  will  be  replaced by  another
one.  Consequently, the worker will set the level of industrial action so that its
cost to the firm is  exactly fs, making the firm indifferent  between retaining
him and replacing him.
Thus,  the  worker's  bargaining  surplus  is  ws  - Qs, whereas  the  firm's
bargaining surplus  is ms - (ws + fs). The Nash bargaining problem can be
formulated  as
max(ws  -Qs)rms - (ws  + fs)]l-v,  0 < v < 1,
Ws
9Note  that,  in  general,  on would  expect  the  optimal  wage to  be  also be  an  increas-
ing  function  of union density.  Here,  it  is  implicitly  assumed  that all  skilled  workers  are
members  of the union.  In  addition,  note  that the target  wage  could  also  be specified  as
increasing  in  the income  tax rate,  itxs, implying  that  the  union  would  demand  higher
wages  to compensate  for a decrease  in after-tax  income.
I 0 In  practice,  redundancy  payments  are  only  made  to  workers  with  some  minimum
period of continuous  service  with the firm.
17where v measures the bargaining strength of the worker relative to the IE£m.
The first-order  condition  is given by
Ms {S (Ws  fs)  _  ) {ms  (WS+  fs)  _
that is,
-ms-  (Ws+  fs) _  _
WS  - n
RFom this equation, the equilibrium negotiated  wage can be de:ived  as
Ws = v(ms - fs)  - (1  - )s
Suppose  that there  is  no  unemployment  benefit,  so that  Qs =  0,  and
that the bargaining strength of a skilled  worker,  v,  varies inverse;.y  with the
rate of skilled  unemployment,  UNE 3 . 7he wage-setting  equatior  can thus
be written  as"
WS  = PLJ UNEI  j  (ms - fs),  (31)
which implies again that the level of wages and the rate of unemployment are
inversely  related,  and that an increase  in the firing  cost reduces  the skilled
wage.
The  skilled  open  unemployment  rate,  UNEs,  is  given by  the  ratio  of
skilled  workers  who  are  not  employed  e.ther  oy  the  private  or  the  public
sector,  divided by the total popuiation of skilled workers:
UNE 5 s  (A  +5G)  (32)
where SG is the total number of skilled worlkers in the lpublic serctc,  engaged
in both the production  of public services,  S4,  and education,  SQ  (s5e  below):
'SG = S4 +  S.  (33)
Skilled  workers  who are  unable to find a Job in the formal  economy opt
to remain openly unemployed,  instead  of enering the informa,  eco2aoy  (ir,
contrast to unskilled  workers),  as  a result  oF eitther  a reservation  wage that
systematically  exceeds  the informal sectcr  wage,  or concerns  about  adverse
"lWith an  unemployment  benefit  proportional  to the  wage,  so  that  32s  - U,J  the
coefficient  v  in the negotiated  wage should be replaced  by vl/[l - (I  - )t.signaling  effects to potential future employers,  as argued in a different  setting
by McCormick  (1990)  and  Gottfries and McCormick  (1995).
The  evolution  of the skilled  labor  force  depends  on the  rate  at  which
unskilled workers  acquire  skills:
S  = (1 - 6s)S-1 + SKL,  (34)
where 0  < 6s <  1 is the rate of depreciation,  or  "de-skilling",  of the skilled
labor force.  The size of the urban population,  URB, is thus
URB = UU +  S,
that is, using  (26)  and  (34):
URB = (1 + gu)U6,-j + MIG +  (1 - 6s)S-1.  (35)
2.2.4  Skills Formation
The acquisition  of skills by unskilled  workers  takes place through an educa-
tion system operated  (free of charge)  by the public  sector.  Specifically,  the
flow  of unskilled  workers  who become  skilled,  SKL,  is taken to  be  a  CES
function of the  "effective"  number of teachers  in the public sector,  SGE,  and
the government  stock of capital in education,  KE  (defined below):
SKL = [iEE(pSGE)PE +  (1  - OE)KEP]PEX,  (36)
where  o measures  the productivity  of public  workers  engaged  in providing
education.  fo is assumed to depend on the relative  wage of skilled workers in
the public sector,  WSG,  relative to the expected wage for that same category
of labor  in the private  sector,  which  (in the absence  of unemployment  ben-
efits)  is given  by one minus the unemployment  rate,  1 - UNEs,  times the
going wage,  Ws.'2 Assuming a simple logistic form (as for instance in Maech-
ler and Roland-Holst  (1997,  p.  492)),  and a one-period lag, this function can
be written  as1 3
12For simplicity,  it is assumed that all  skilled workers  in the public sector earn the same
nominal wage.
13Wages  in equations  (37)  and  (38)  are specified  in nominal  terms,  because  they  are
assumed to be both deflated  by the same price index-the price of the consumption basket
for skilled workers  in the urban  sector.
19so =  {1  +xexp  [  (  - UNEs,1 )  s,  }c>O.  0  (37)
WSG,1l
This  equation  shows  that the  higher the  public  sector  wage  relative  to
its opportunity  cost, the greater the level of effort  by teachers  in the public
sector,  and thus the greater  the nrumber  of slilled workers  produced by the
system.  Alternatively,  the effort :Eiction  derived by Ag6nor  and Aizenman
(1999)  could also be used:
y7  =-(P.  [(  WS  G5  I  ]  [ > 0,  (38)
and where 0 <Pm <  1 denotes the  "min3 mum"  level of effort.
2.3  $UPPRy am  Demad
Both the informal  and public sector goods  aye nontradables,  and both mar-
kets  clear continuously.  In each  sector,  total supply  is  thus equal  to gross
production, that is,  X 2 = Q2  and  X4 =  Q4.
Rural  and  private  formal  urban  goods,  by  contrast,  compete  with im-
ported  goods.  The supply of the composite  good  for  each  of these  sectors,
Qs  and  Q3,  consists of a CES combination of imports and domestically  pro-
duced goods:
aQ =  i{ 3Q1 Ml  (E-Ik 1 )D 1 Q'}  PQ1,  (39)
Q3= aQ 3 {Q 3M3 3  +  (i  - Q3)(D 3)  Q3}  PQ*  (40)
Aggregate  demand in each sector consists of intermediate  and final con-
sumption,  government  spending,  and investment  demand:
Q4=Ci+INTh, fori=1,2,4  (41)
Q3=C3 +G 3 +Z 3 +INT 3 ,  (42)
where INT, is defined  as total demand (by al  productions  sectors) for inter-
mediate consumption  of good j:
INT3  =  Za 3iXi  for j =,...4.  (43)
20For the agricultural,  public and informal sector goods,  aggregate  demand
consists of intermediate  consumption and private final consumption  (C1,  C2,
and  C4).  Aggregate  demand for the private formal good consists of interme-
diate  consumption,  final consumption  by households  and the public sector,
C3 and G3,  and private investment,  Z3.
Other  current  government  spending  on  goods,  Gc,  and  public  invest-
ment expenditure,  ZG (that is, total government  expenditure minus salaries,
transfers, subsidies and interest payments) is spent only on the private formal
sector good,  so that  G3 is equal to
G3 = Gc + Z.  (44)
Each category of household h determines final consumption for each type
of good i,  CAh,  so as to maximize  a Stone-Geary  utility function,  Uh,  which
takes the form
4
Uh  =  Z(Cih  - PClXih)I,h,
t=1
where  X1h  is  real  autonomous  consumption  of good  i by household  h,  the
coefficients  CCth are the marginal budget shares of good i in total consumption
expenditure by household  h, Ch, and PC, is the actual sales price of good  i
(defined  below).  These shares satisfy the standard restrictions
4
0  <  CCsh <  1,  Vi, h  and  E  cCh=1.
2=1
Maximization  of the utility function  Uh  subject to household  h's budget
constraint  E4=1 Ch  - COh = 0 yields the familiar  demand functions
CAh =  X1h +  CCzh(COh  ;,.=1 PC,Xih)  (45)
Total final private  consumption  for each  production  sector  i,  C1,  is the
summation across  all categories of households  of consumption  of good i:
n
Ci = E  C 1 h  *  (46)
h=l
Total private investment, Zp, consists of purchases of urban private sector
goods:
Z3 =  PC3  '(47)
21where  PK is the price of capital goods.
2.4  xterna  aade
As  indicated  earlier,  firms in agricultu-re  allocate  their output tc exports  or
the domestic  market according to the PI?F specified  in equation  (3) and the
relative  price  of exports,  PE1,  vis-a-vis  domestic  goods,  PD1. Efficiency
conditions  require  that  firms  equate  this relative  price to the  portaity
cost in production.  This yields:
El  (PE, 1
1 -ED)i  aED1
Di PD 1 /3 OEDi  )  (48)
Similarly,  using the PPF specified in equation  (11),  the allocation of out-
put between exports and domestic sales by Rrms in the private formal sector
is given by
E3  (PE 3 I - fED3 )ED 3
P D3 /OED3 )  '(9
where  PE3/PD 3 is  the price  of exports  relative  to the  price  of  domestic
goods.
l[mports  compete  with  domestic  goods  in  agriculture  as  wel& as  in  the
urban  formal  private  sector.  Making  use  of Armington  functions  for  the
demand  for imported vs.  domestic goods and xrelative prices, import demand
for both sectors  (Ml  and M3)  car be written as:
M1l= DI (SPM,f1  * 1-  1  )  '  (50)
M D)  (  PD3  Q  )  Q  (51)
These  equations  show  that  the  rat;o  of imports  to both  categories  of
domestic goods depends on the relative prices of these goods and the elasticity
of substitution,  oQ1 and  UQ3, between these goods.
2o5 EDr ces
By  definition,  the net  value  of  output  (that  is,  gross  output  adjusted  for
indirect  taxes)  in sector  i  must be  equal  to value  added  plus  s-lending  on
22intermediate inputs  (purchased  at composite prices):
4
(1-  atxi)PX,X,  =  PV2V,  +  E  a3,PC3 Xi,
3=1
where  PXi  is the gross price  of output,  and atx, the indirect  tax rate  (or  a
subsidy rate,  if negative)  on  output in sector  i,  with atX 2 = 0  (there  is no
indirect taxation of informal sector production).  From this equation, the net
or value added price of output can be derived  as
PV=V  i  PXi(1-atXi)-2Ea,aPC,  X2.  (52)
The  world  prices  of imported  and exported  goods  are  taken  to be  ex-
ogenously  given.  The  domestic  currency  price  of these  goods  is  obtained
by adjusting the  world price  by the exchange  rate,  with import  prices  also
adjusted  by the tariff rate, itm:
PE, = wpe 1 ER,  for i = 1, 3,  (53)
PM, = wpm,,(I  + itm,)ER,  for i = 1, 3.  (54)
Because the transformation function between  exports and domestic  sales
of agricultural  goods is linear homogeneous,  the gross output  price,  PX1 , is
derived  from the expenditure identity:
PD,D1 + PEE,  (E)
X1
Similarly, the gross output price in the urban formal private sector, PX3,
is given by
PX3  PD3D3 +  PE 3E3 (56)
x 3
The  price  of domestic  sales  in  agriculture,  PD1, adjusts  to equilibrate
supply and demand.'4 For the price of domestic  sales by firms  in the urban
141n  solving  the model,  equation  (50)  is used to  solve for PD 1, and,  because Q'  =  Qd
(41)  is used to solve for the equilibrium  value  of Ql.  The composite  good  CES  equation
(39)  is then inverted  to solve for Ml  and the CET function  (3)  is inverted to solve for Dl.
This procedure ensures that the composite price (and thus indirectly the price of domestic
sales)  adjusts to equilibrate  supply  and demand.
23formal  private  sector,  PD3,  two  options  are  considered.  In  the first  case,
PD3 is  assumed to be fully  fiexiole  and determined  in a manne-  similar to
PD1. In the  second,  PD3 is  assumed  'Lo  be set  as a  markup  over  variable
costs.  Because both private and public stocks  of physical  capit1  are taken
as given, total variable costs  (involving labor and intermediate  c-sumption)
associated with private urban production,  TVC3,  are given by
TVC3 = [(1 + ptu)  WM  - ESu  U3  + W 5Sd +  X3 a,3P,  (57)
The average  variable cost, AVC3,  is thus
AVC3 = TVC3/PX3X 3 ,  (58)
and the price of domestic  sales, PD 3 , is therefore given  by
PD3 = (1+  mk)AVC 3,  (59)
where  mk  is  the constant  markup  rate.  Given  this  specificat  on,  and  to
maintain market equilibrium, the actual quantity of domestic goods must be
assumed to be determined  by the demand side,  and the production  function
can be inverted to solve for the demand of one of the labor categories.  Firms
would thus typically be  "off'  their optimal labor demand curve.
For the agricultural  sector  and the urban formal. private sector,  the sub-
stitution  function between  imports  and domestic  goods  is also  lUnearly  ho-
mogeneous,  and  the  composite  price  for  eacha  sector,  PQi, is  determined
accordingly  by the expenditu-e identity:
MiPM, ± DgPDi
PQi =  Qd  ,  for i = 1,3.  (60)
The actual sales price for the agricultural and formal private sector goods,
PC,  differs from the composite price  as a result of a sales tax,  levied at the
rate stx,:
PC, = (1  + stxi)PQ,, for i = i, 3.
For the informal  and public  sectors  (both of which  do not  export),  the
composite price is equal to the domestic  market price.  In turn, because these
24sectors  do not  compete  with imports,  the  domestic  price,  PD,, is  simply
equal to the gross  output price,  PX 1:
PQ, = PD, = PX1 = PCi, for i = 2,4,  (61)
where stx,  =  0,  for  i = 2, 4.
The nested CES production function of private formal urban goods is also
linearly homogeneous;  prices of the composite inputs are therefore  derived in
similar fashion:
JHPHP  =  JLPL/  +  [(1 + ptxu) WM  - ESU1U3.  (62)
JLPL =  PR 3 + WSS 3,  (63)
where PR3 is (before  tax) profits by private firms in the formal urban sector,
which is here viewed  as the (gross)  return to physical  capital.
The price  of capital  is constructed  by  using the identity defining  invest-
ment expenditure, equation (47), which involves only the urban private sector
good:
PK  - C  PC3,  (64)
ZP
because  Z3 = ZP.
The consumption  price index for the rural sector is given by
PR  = SXPCt  C
where  0  <  OR  <  1 denotes the relative  weight  of good i in the index,  with
OR  =  1.  Similarly, the consumption price indexes for urban unskilled  and
skilled  workers are given by
Puu = E9YPCt,  PUS =  EO PCi,  (65)
where  the  OSu  and  Os  are  relative  weights  that  reflect  the  composition  of
spending by each group in a base period,  with Ei  =  >r  O< = 1. As noted
below, these indexes are used to update the rural and urban poverty lines in
simulation experiments.
25Firms'  profits  are  defined  as  revenue  minus  total labor  costs.  12 the  case
of the agricultural  sector firms,  and urban informal sector firms,  profits  are
simply given by
PR, = PV  V,-W  EJ,  for i = 1, 2.  (66)
Profits  of  urban  private  sector  firms  account  for  both  working  capital
costs and salaries paid to both categories of workers,  as well as payroll taxes
and firing costs, FC, for both categories of workers:15
PR3 =  PV 3(V3 - FC)  - [(1 + ptxu)WM  - ESU]U 3 - WSS 3 ,  (67)
where total firing costs are given by
FC = fu max(O, U3,_1 - U3)  + fs max(O, S3, 1 - S3),  (68)
with fs, fu denoting the fixed fring cost per  worlker  (skilled  and uskilled,
respectively).
Household  income  is based on the return to labor  (salaries),  distributed
profits,  and government  transfers.  Households  are  defined according  to the
level  of skills of its members  and their sector of employment.  There is  one
rural household,  (indexed by a)  comprising  all workers employed  in agricul-
ture.  In the urban sector there are two types of unskilled househoids  (denoted
by b and c), those working in the informal  sector and those employed in the
formal sector  ((both public and private).  The fourth household  (denoted by
d) consists of skilled workers employed in the formal urban economy  (in both
the private and public sectors).  Finally, there is a capitalist-rentier household
(denoted  by e) whose income  derives mainly from firms'  net earnings in the
urban private sector.  Households in both agriculture and the infcrmal urban
economy  own the firms in which they are employed.
Encome  of agricultural  and informal  sector households  is  given  by,  with
h = a,b  and i = 1,2:
YHh = (PR, +  WAUJ)  +  -YhTR = PVVi +  YhTR,  (69)
1 5Note  that payroll  taxes  are  assumed  to be  levied  on  the total  wage  bil  excluding
interest payments, that is, Wm U3  instead of (1 + iL)WM  U3. Note also that azing costs are
assumed  to be paid on the total reduction  in the number  of workers,  thereby neglecting
t"natural"  attrition  (retirement)  and voluntary  quits.
26where  aYh  is  the portion of total government  transfers  (TR)  each group  re-
ceives.
Income  of the  urban  formal  unskilled,  and  skilled  households,  depends
on government  transfers, salaries,  and possibly redundancy  payments;  firms
provide no source of income,  because these groups do not own the production
units in which they are  employed:
YHc = WMU3 +  WuGU4 + PV 3fu max(0, U3,_1  - U3) +  ycTR,  (70)
YHd = WSSP +  WSGSG + PV3fS max(O, S 3,-1 -S 3)  +  YdTR,  (71)
where SG is the total number of skilled workers  in the public sector, engaged
in both the production  of services  and training  (see  (33)).
Firms in the private urban sector pay income taxes,  and interest on their
foreign borrowing,  FL3. Their net  (after-tax)  profits,  NPR3 ,  are thus
NPR3 = (1 - itXf)PR3  - i*ER * FL 3,_1,  (72)
where itxf is the corporate income tax rate and i* is the interest rate paid on
foreign loans,  taken to be exogenous.  A portion of these net profits,  X, are
retained for the purpose of financing investment; the remainder is transferred
to the capitalist-rentier  household.  Thus, total income of that group is given
by
YHe  =  (1-  X)NPR3 +  yeTR.  (73)
2.7  Private Consumption and Savings
Each category of household  h = a, ...e saves  a fixed  fraction,  0 < srh < 1,  of
its disposable income:
SAVh  = srh(l - itXh)YHh,  (74)
where 0 < itxh < 1 is the income tax rate applicable  to household  h.
The portion  of disposable  income that is not  saved is  allocated  to  con-
sumption:
COh =  (1  - Srh)(1 - itXh)YHh.  (75)
2720g  Private  rnvestmat
Capital  accumulation  occurs  only  i'  the urgan  6orTaal  privato  C.cr.  To
examine  the decision  to  invest,  defne  Izrst-  t'c  after-tax  rate  ^l  ,cW--  on
private physical capital, IK,  as the ratio of net profits to th2e  sto'COk  f c apptal:
IxK  (i-itZf)P_3  (73)
PIKK3
The  desired  capital  stock  by  firms  ir  the  private  cor.ai  -:  ban  sxctor
is  determnined  so as  to equate  the  after'tax  rate  of returzn  on. ca- taI  plu.s
the rate of capital  gains  due to changes  iE the price  of capi'c.,  and mnus
depreciation  (at the rate  63)  to  the opportunity  cost  of  ingEcstTr-<.t,  which
(assuming  the absence  of  "effective"  restrictions  to capital mobil  ,y)  is here
taken to be the world  interest rate, adjusted  for the rate  of cen:--.ation  of
the nominal  exchange  rate,  e:
IK  -63  +  p  =i-  E,(.)
where 0 < 63  < I.  One could  also add to the marginal cost  offor&gn  caoitai
on the right-hand  side  of this equation  a risk premikim,  to re..c_t  'type
of  imperfections  that  developing  count:res  face  on  wo-ld  cakts  maar-kets.
Such a premium could be specified,  for instance,  as a convex f  Lr  of the
difference  between  the value  of tbe private  capital  stoc!<,  P'KK3,  -rlative  to
firms' foreign  borrowing,  ER * FL3 ,  WhSci  in the prese nt setting e-resents
a measure of firms' net worth.
Using equation  (76),  and setting E = 0,  tais arbitrage  condt:;'-.-  y-Ilds1 6
PR 3 (1(  - tf
K3  =  PK  iC +  63-  APK/IPK-1  (78)
Actual investment in each period is determined  by a paotial  g  .j-kStM  ent
process,  and  is given  as  a functioD  of the ratio  between  t7ne  &esirzA capital
stock and last period's  capital stock:
Z4  J Ki, 
K3,_1  Ko<lg3_,  - ,  (79)
1 6When  checking for homogeneity  ok- degree  zero in prices  (including the e.:chrnge rate,
which is  the numeraire  here),  the  rate of  deoreciation  must  indeed  be accc-.:-ted  for  in
(78).
28where  zo,  Yz  > 0.  This investment  function  is,  of course,  very  simple  and
does not account for a variety of other factors that have been shown to be im-
portant for developing countries-such as inflation,  macroeconomic volatility,
public  capital in  infrastructure,  and possibly  foreign  borrowing."7 Some of
these modifications  can easily be introduced.  Note also that,  although there
is no direct effect  of the public capital stock in infrastructure, KR,  on private
investment,  KR  does  affect  the overall  stock of public  capital,  KG  (defined
below),  which in turn affects the production process-and thus indirectly the
desired capital stock, through profits.
The capital  stock depends  on the flow  level  of investment,  Zp,  and the
depreciation  rate:
K3 =  K 3,1(1  - 63)  +  ZP-1. (80)
The net worth of private urban firms in nominal terms,  NW3,  is defined
as the value of physical capital,  net of foreign borrowing,  FL3 :
NW3 =  PKK3  - ER - FL3 ,
which changes  over time according  to
NW3 =  NW3,-1 + PKAK 3 - ER * AFL 3 +  APKK 3,-l
The last term on the right-hand side of this expression represents  capital
gains  associated  with  changes  in  the price  of capital.  Note  that  changes
in NW3 have  no feedback  effects  on the  economy,  unlike  what  happens  in
the  "full"  IMMIPA  model  of Agenor,  Izquierdo  and Fofack (2003),  in which
banks  charge  a risk premium on  their loans that is inversely  related to the
borrower's  net  worth.  In  the  present  setting,  a  feedback  effect  could  be
introduced  by adding a risk premium to the marginal cost of foreign capital,
as noted earlier.
The ex post aggregate identity (or ex ante equilibrium condition)  between
savings and investment is specified as follows.  Total gross investment in phys-
ical  capital  measured  in  nominal terms,  which  is equal to  PK(ZP +  ZG),  is
financed by firms'  after-tax retained earnings,  total after-tax household  sav-
ings,  "primary"  government  savings (that is,  before investment),  and foreign
1 7See Agenor  (2000,  Chapter  1),  Agenor and  Montiel  (Chapter  3),  Agenor,  Izquierdo,
and Fofack  (2003),  Jimenez  (1995),  and recent studies  by Sanchez-Robles  (1998),  Ahmed
and Miller  (2000),  Ghura and Goodwin  (2000),  Hendricks  (2000),  and Wang  (2992).
29borrowing  by firms  and the govermnent.  Given the  definition  of the  over-
all government  fiscal balance  given below in  (84),  GBAL,  this identity can
therefore  be written with private investment only on the left-hand  side:
PKZP = XNPR3 +  Z  SAV,  +  GBAL + ER(AFL3 +  AFLG),  (82)
h
where FLg is foreign  borrowing  by the government.  In the simulations  re-
ported  below this  equation  is solved  residually  for  the savings  rate of ren-
tiers and capitalists,  sre.  In thats sense, then, the basic model is  "investsment
driven",  although of course other closure rules are possible.  For instance, one
could  solve  "backward"  for the government  budget  balance  and  deternmine
the level of current public expenditure that is consistent  with  (82).  Alterna-
tively,  one could drop purely  and simply  the investment  equatior  (79)  and
solve  (82)  instead for  Zp.  ln that case,  then, the model would be  "savings
driven"  (see Dewatripont  and Michel  (1987)).
2.O  PubHc  SeteO  c  r
Government expenditures consist of final consumption, which only has demand-
side effects,  and public investment,  which has both demand- and supply-side
effects.  Total public investment,  ZG,  consists of investment in infrastructure,
IR,  education,  IE, and health,  IH,which  are all considered  exogenous  policy
variables:18
ZG =  IR + IE  + IH.  (83)
Investment in infrastructure consists of the accumulation of public capital
such as roads, power plants and railroads.  Investment  in educatio..  consists of
the accumulation of assets such as school buildings and other  infzastructure
affecting the acquisition of skills (for instance, research institutions),  out does
not represent human capital.  In a similar fashion, investment in health adds
to the stock of public assets such  as hospitals.
Rom  (13),  PV4V4 - (WUGU4  +  WSGS4)  =  0,  that  is,  all  va2.e  added
generated  by the production  of public  goods  is distributed  as  wages.  The
' 8See  Jimenez  (1995),  Tanzi  and  Zee  (1997),  Sanz  and VelAzquez  (2001),  and Webber
(2002),  for  a discussion  of the links  between  thle  composition  of public  investment  and
growth.  It should  be noted that this treatment  of public  investment  differs from standard
data classification  reported  in national  accounts;  in many instances these  investments  are
classified as current  expenditures.
30government  fiscal balance,  GBAL,  is thus defined  as
GBAL = TAX  - TR-  WSGSGE  - ESUU3  - PC3(Gc + ZG) - icER  * FLG, 1 .
(84)
where TAX  denotes  total tax revenues,  TR government  transfers to house-
holds,  WSGSGE  the  wage  bill  on  school  teachers,  ESuU3  total  employment
subsidies to firms in the private formal sector, Gc other real current expendi-
tures on goods and services,  ZG real investment spending, and iaER-  FLG,_
is interest payments  on foreign borrowing.
Total tax  revenues  consist  of revenue  generated  by import  tariffs,  sales
taxes, income taxes,  and payroll taxes  on unskilled labor:
TAX  =  Z  itm,(ER *  wpm,M1) +ptxUWMU 3 (85)
X=1,3
4
+itxf PR3 +  E  atx,PX 1X,  + E  itXhYHh  +  E  stX"PQAQ 1,
1=1  h  =1,3
with atxrr  = 0.
Public investment in infrastructure,  health, and education,  determines the
rate at which the stock of each type  of public capital,  K3,  with j = E, H, R,
grows over time.  Accumulation of each type of capital is thus defined  as:
Kj = K 3, 1(l - (53)  +  I3,-,,  where j  = E, H, R.  (86)
where  0 < 63  < 1 is a depreciation  rate.
Infrastructure  and health capital  are combined  through  a CES function
to produce the stock of public  capital,  KG:
KG = aG{/GKR  G±  (1- 3G)KHPG} PG . (87)
2.10  Balance  of Payments
The external constraint implies that any current  account surplus  (or deficit)
must be compensated  by a net  outflow  (or  inflow)  of foreign capital,  given
by the sum of changes  in net foreign  borrowing by the government,  AFLG,
and private  firms,  A\FL 3:
,  (wpe,E, - wpmzM1)  + i*(FLG,_l +  FL3,_1)  + L\FLG + AFL3 =  0.  (88)
i=1,3
31In the simulations reported below,  E  assume that public foreign borrowing
is  exogenous,  and that  private foreign  borrowing  adjusts to ecq-Sribrate  the
balance of payments.
Figure 3 summarizes  the structure  of the labor market in nini-iMMPA,
whereas  Figure 4 captures  overall linkages.  Appendix A provides  a complete
list of equations,  Appendix B varia70le  definitions,  and Appendix  C discusses
calibration and solution proceduzes,  as well as parameter  values.1 9
2O.L1  PrDety and1  ]$,Z  E  (COa
The procedure  followed in mini-IMMPA  to assess the poverty  a2d distribu-
tional effects of exogenous and policy shock6s is similar to the one in  VMMPA,
which  is  described  at length  in  Ag6ncr,  Lzqnierdo,  and  Fofack  (2003)  and
evaluated  against  several  alternatives  by  Ag6nor  and  Grimm  (2003).  This
procedure assumes that initial rural and urban poverty lines are exogenously
set in real terms  and involves  linking the  "structural" component  described
earlier to a household  income  and expenditure  survey,  organized  along the
household structure described earlier.  Specifically,  the calculation  of poverty
indices-the  poverty headcount index  (the proportion of individuals  earning
less than the poverty line)  and the poverty gap  (the average shortfall of the
income of the poor with respect to the poverty line, multiplied by the head-
count  index)-as  well  as  distributional  indicators  (the Gini  coefficient  and
the Theil inequality  index) involves the following steps:
o  Step 1. Classify the data in the household survey into the categories  of
households  contained in the structural component  of the model.  Here,
as noted earlier,  there are .five categories  of households-workers  in the
rural  sector,  those  in  the urban  (unskilled)  informal  economy,  urban
unskilled  workers  in the  formal  sector,  urban  skilled  wo:rkers  in  the
formal sector,  and capitalists-rentiers.
o  Step  2.  Following  a policy  or exogenous  shock,  generate  real  growth
rates in per capita consumption and disposable  income  fo6  all  'ive cat-
19As implied by Walras'  Law,  one equilibrium  condition may be droppe6 because it can
be  deducted  from  the  other  equilibrium  conditions.  Instead  of dropping  one equation,
the  computer  program  checks  numerically  for  continuous  equality  between  savings  and
investment,  as given in equation  (82),  by ensuring that a residual variable  is continuously
equal to zero.
32egories  of households,  up to the end of the simulation  horizon  (say,  T
periods) .
*  Step 3.  Apply these growth rates separately to the per capita (dispos-
able)  income  and  consumption  expenditure  for each household  in the
survey.  This  gives  a new vector  of absolute income  and consumption
levels for each group, for periods  1,...T.
*  Step  4.  Calculate  poverty and  income  distribution  indicators,  using
the new absolute nominal levels of income and consumption for each in-
dividual and each group, and after updating the initial rural and urban
poverty lines, using the prices indexes generated by the structural  com-
ponent of the model, to reflect changes  in the price of the consumption
basket  and purchasing  power of income.
*  Step  5.  Using  the rates  of growth of  employment  generated  by the
structural component  of the model,  adjust the relative weights of each
household group in the urban sector (as given in the survey)  and calcu-
late the reweighted poverty and distributional indicators for that sector
as a whole.20
*  Step  6.  Compare the post-shock  poverty and income  distribution  in-
dicators  with the baseline  values to assess the impact  of the shock on
the poor and the degree of inequality for periods  1, ...T.
The  household  survey  that I  use  to perform the  policy  experiments  re-
ported below is an artificial survey,  constructed  as follows.  First, a sample of
5,000 observations  was produced, with the share of each household group cor-
responding exactly to that in the structural component of the model.2'  Each
observation was considered to represent one household.  Second,  using a ran-
dom number generator  and  a log-normal  distribution,  values  for  disposable
income and consumption expenditure were drawn for each household.  As pa-
rameters for each group,  the initial values  for average disposable income and
20The same  reweighting  procedure would  need to be applied  to the rural sector  if there
was more  than one category  of households  there.
2 These  shares  are 28.2  percent  of workers  in the rural sector,  45.3 percent  of workers
in the informal urban sector,  13.7 percent  of unskilled workers in the formal urban sector,
9.9 percent  of skilled workers  in the formal urban sector,  and 3 percent of capitalists  and
rentiers.
33average consumption expenditure  (which are taken from the caiTbrated data-
base) are imposed as mean and as standard deviation.  For skille-& workers in
the formal urban sector and for capitalist and rentiers, a standard deviation
of 0.8 times  the mean  is  assumned.  Figure  5  shows  the distribtion of  con-
sumption in each group.  Third, the incorne poverty  line for the rural sector
is set (somewhat  arbitrarily) such that the percentage  of rural houiseholds in
poverty  is  50  percent.  The  poverty line in  urban  areas  is then assumed  to
be  15  percent  higher.  The rural  and  urban  poverty  lines  for  consumption
expenditure are calculated  in the same manner.  This procedure produces an
economy-wide,  income-based  headcount  poverty  index  of 38.6  percent  and
an economy-wide  consumption-based  headcount  index  of 41.1  percent.  For
income distribution,  the overall  Gini index is 0.48  (consumption  based)  and
0.49  (income  based).22 The within-group  Theil inequality  decomposition  is
78 percent  (consumption  based)  and 73 percent  (income based).
3  Nhcy Mxp'men(t
Mini-IMMPA  can  be  used  to  analyze  a  variety  of  policy  ana  exogenous
shocks.  For illustrative  purposes,  the growth,  unemployment  and poverty
effects  of two types of labor market  policies are examined in this section:  a
cut in the minimum wage and a reduction in the payroll tax rate on unskilled
labor.23 Both experiments relate to critical policy issues  in developing coun-
tries.  Economists have long debated the roie of minimnum wage legislation in
labor market  adjustment.  Advocates have  oLten  viewed  minimum wages  as
being  beneficial  in various  ways-through  its positive effect  on-  nutrition or
productivity,  or as an instrunent of income redistribution  and social justice.
By contrast,  opponents argue that minimum  wage legislation,  bI  preventing
wages from adjusting downward to excess supply of labor, impos^-s  an implicit
tax on employers  in the formal  economy,  leads to misallocation  of labor  (by
preventing wages from adjusting downward to excess supply of  ala  nr)  ad cre-
ates unemployment  (particularly for unskilled workers), induces .labor market
22The income-based  Gini  coefficients  are  0.45  for  the rural  sector,  0.48  for the urban
sector,  0.44  for the  informal sector  households,  0.43  for urban unskilled households,  0.38
for urban skilled households,  and 0.39 for capitalists  and rentiers.
231n  these  simulations,  PD3 is  assumed  to  be  fully  flexible,  the  skilled  wage-setting
equation  (29)  and the effort  function  (38)  are  used,  and both the unskilled public  sector
wage and the minimum wage are taken  to be fixed in nominal terms (idxu  idxM = 0).
34segmentation,  and depresses  wages  in the informal urban sector-which  has
an  adverse  effect  on the  poor.  By increasing the  relative  cost of employing
unskilled workers,  a high minimum wage may also accelerate the substitution
of capital for  unskilled labor  and reduce profits-and thus firms' capacity  to
invest.  As  a result  of both  factors,  high minimum  wages  may restrain  the
expansion  of labor  demand  over  time.  Thus,  a  government-mandated  in-
crease the minimum wage (assuming that it is binding)  may not only reduce
employment  but also raise poverty, because the increase in the marginal cost
of labor will lead firms to scale back hiring-forcing  the  unemployed to en-
ter the informal  sector  and  depressing wages  there.24 Thus,  changes  in the
minimum wage are likely to have important  distributional effects among (un-
skilled)  workers,  notably between  those employed  in the formal  sector  and
those  in  the informal  sector.  Similarly,  in  both  industrial  and  developing
countries,  a flat  payroll  tax  is  often imposed  on employers  to finance  gen-
eral government expenditure,  or more specifically  the pension system or the
unemployment  benefit  scheme.25 The conventional,  partial equilibrium  view
suggests that the  incidence  of such  a tax-its  actual  burden-depends  on
the elasticity of labor supply and the degree  of wage rigidity.  But  it is  also
important  to account  for general  equilibrium  effects.  The  effect  on  wages
depends  on  the structure  of the labor market.  For instance,  an increase  in
employers'  social security contributions may initially cause an increase  in la-
bor costs and lower employment;  but the ensuing  increase in unemployment
may  drive  wages  down  over  time,  thereby  offsetting  the  higher  non-wage
costs.  In addition,  the  effect  of a reduction  in  payroll taxation  depends  to
a very significant  extent on how the cut  is financed;  with a binding budget
constraint, reducing the payroll tax requires shifting the tax burden to some
other tax base.  Thus,  it is important to consider  alternative  financing rules
in evaluating  the effect  of a cut in the payroll tax.
24If a binding minimum  wage does not reduce employment among the poor, it will also
reduce poverty if a large number of poor households consist of low-wage workers.  However,
in many poor households,  no  one may be employed  in a formal sector job.  If indeed  low-
paid workers  axe not in poor households,  much of an income gain that may come from  an
increase  in the minimum wage would  benefit  those that are not poor to begin  with.
25Financing of unemployment  benefit schemes  is in general  usually shared  between em-
ployers  and  employees-but  the  employers'  contribution  is  usually  substantially  higher
than employees'  contribution.
353.1  Fldcto  kU^Wa  the  Mfin=m  Wage^L  A.af 
The simulation results  associated  with a permanent,  5 percent  rcd-iiction  in
the minimum wage  are illustrated in Tables  1 and 2,  which  display relative
and absolute percentage changes from the baseline  sol.ution, respcctively,  for
the first  10  periods  after the  shock.  This  time period  is  referred to  below
as the  "adjustment  period."  The experiment  assumes that the government
borrows  domestically to finance its deficit-implying  therefore  (as discussed
earlier) an offsetting adjustment in the savings rate of capitJalists  a.rd rentiers,
in order to maintain the aggregate  bala-ace  between  savings  and 'nvestment
(equation (82)).26  Table 1 provides data on national accounts,  fiscal accounts,
and the labor market,  whereas Table 2 sHows  changes in prices, consumption
and  income  for each household  group,  and poverty  and distributional  indi-
cators,  both income-  and  consumption-based.  Also shown in TLable  2  is the
real  exchange  rate,  defined  as a weighted  average  of the domest c-currency
price of exports and imports (with weights based on initial volumcs of trade),
divided  by  a weighted  average  of the price  of domestic  sales of agricuJ.tural
and private  sector goods.
The  impact  effect  of the reduction  in thhe  minimum wage  is  an  increase
in the demand  for  unskilled  labor  in the  private  sector  of the ^rcder  of 4.3
percent  in the first year.  The increase ir demand is met by the existing pool
of unskilled workers seeking employment in the urban sector.  As a result, the
unskilled unemployment  rate drops sigrificantly,  by 2.8 percentage  points in
the first year.27 The cut in the minimuum  wage, by reducing the r_eiative  cost
of unskilled labor,  leads  to substitution  among production  factors not only
on impact  but also over time.  Because unskilled  labor has a relatively  high
elasticity  of substitution with respect  to the  composite  factor consisting  of
skilled labor  and physical  capital,  the -lower  cost of that categcry  of labor
gives private firms in the formal sector an incentive to substitute away from
skilled  labor and physical  capital.  In tmrn,  the fall in the demand  for that
category of labor puts downward pressure on skilled wages,  which drop by 1.6
26How this "transfer"  of private savings to the government  takes place is not explicitly
specified;  one can  think of a "pure"  financial  ;ntermediary  operating  in the  background.
Note that a more elaborate approach  would involve  accounting  explicitly  fe: the issuance
of government  bonds, and thus portfoiEo  decisions  on the part  of savers.
27Note that, from equation  (23),  the initial change  in unskilled  unemployment  is given
by AUNEu,o = -AU3dO/U;.  It therefore depends on the initial number of workers seeking
employment  in the formal sector.  Similarly, from  (32), AUNEs,O = -AS3,G/S.
36percent  in the first period.  On impact,  labor supply  is fixed  in agriculture
and the  informal economy,  so the  level  of employment  does  not change  in
either  sector-and  neither  does  the  level  of  activity  (real  value  added  in
both sectors  is constant).  The rise in real disposable income  (by 1.1  percent
and  1.5  percent,  respectively)  and  real  consumption  of rural  and informal
sector  households  leads  to higher  value  added  prices  and higher  wages  in
both sectors.  But value added  prices  go up by  slightly more than wages  in
the second  and  subsequent  periods,  implying  a fall  in the product  wage  in
both sectors and a rise in employment.
Over time, changes in wage differentials affect both rural-urban and formal-
informal  migration  flows,  and  therefore  the  supply  of labor  in the various
production  sectors.  The expected  unskilled  wage  in the  formal economy  is
constant  on impact,  as  implied  by  (17)  and  (18).  Despite  the  increase  in
unskilled  employment  in the private sector  in the first period  (and thus the
increase  in the probability  of finding  a job),  the fall  in the  minimum  wage
is such that the urban  expected  wage  falls.  Moreover,  because  agricultural
sector  wages  rise,  the expected  urban-rural  wage  differential  (measured  in
proportion  of the  rural  wage)  falls  by  8.7 percentage  points  in the second
period,  with this differential  narrowing  over time.  As a result, the  inflow of
unskilled workers  into the formal sector  (measured in proportion  of the total
formal urban labor supply)  falls by about  1.2 percent in periods 2 and 3.  The
reduction in the inflow of labor leads to an increase in informal sector wages
throughout  the  adjustment  period,  by 2.6  percent  in  period  2,  1.6 percent
in period  3,  and so  on.  This increase  in the informal  sector  wage,  coupled
with  the reduction  in the minimum  wage  (as  well  as the expected  wage  in
the urban formal private sector,  despite the higher employment  probability)
leads  to a  sharp  fall in period  2  in the expected  formal-informal  wage  dif-
ferential.  This  tends  therefore  to reduce  (by  1.2  percent  in  period  2,  and
about  2  percent  over the  entire adjustment  period)  the number of workers
willing to queue for employment  in the urban private sector.  This,  coupled
with the sustained  effect of the  cut in the minimum wage on labor demand,
explains the large effect  on unemployment,  which  averages  about  5 percent
in the  long run.  Note  also that throughout  the adjustment  period,  despite
significant fluctuations  in the expected formal-informal  wage differential  and
formal-informal  migration  flows,  the supply of unskilled labor in the formal
private sector remains systematically  lower than its baseline  value.
Although the behavior of nominal wages in agriculture reflects essentially
changes  in  value  added  prices  on  impact  (as noted  earlier),  over time it  is
37also affected  by changes in labor elemand -induced  by changes in holuseholds'
disposable  income  and  expenditure-and  migration  flows.  Aftef  an initial
increase  in nominal  wages,  lower  migration  flows  to urban  areas  begin  to
put  downward  pressure  on rural  wages,  which  end  up  faling  (in nominal
terms)  by  1.6  percent  in period  9  and  1.8  percent  in  the last period.  As
also indicated  earlier,  the reduction  in the cost  of unskilled  labor induces  a
substitution  away from skilled labor,  which brings a sustained  fall in skilled
wages  in nominal  terms  (by  about  1.3 percent  in the long run).  Hlowever,
the  overall  effect  on  labor demand  is not  large;  skilled  employment  ir. the
private  formal  sector  falls in the  long run  by only about  0.1  percent.  And
because  the  supply  of  skilled  labor  remains  roughly  constant  t-I^oughout
(public investment  in education and the number  of school teachers are held
constant  at  their baseline  values),  the  skilled  unemployment  ra..e  rises  by
about  the same  amount  (in percentage  points).28 The reason fCr  the small
effect on skilled  employment is that the direct substitution effect  associated
with the reduction in the minimum wage is offset by a fall in the skilled wage,
resulting  from  general  equilibrium  effects-the  drop in  the  nominal  skilled
wage is less than the fall in the value added price of the urban private formal
sector, implying a rise in the product wage,  and thus dampening tbae demand
for  labor.  For instance,  the  nominal  skilled  wage  drops  by  1.6  percent  in
period 1, 2.4 percent in period  2, 1.4  percent  in period 3, and 0.7 percent  in
period  4;  at the  same time,  the  price of  value  added  in  the private  formal
sector drops  by 2.4 percent in period  1, 3.1 percent  in period  2,  2.0 percent
in period  3,  and  1.4 percent  in period  4.
The long-run effect on aggregate output (or real GDIP)  is slightly positive,
at  about  0.3  percent.29 Changes  im  real output  (as  measured  by real value
added)  are also positive and small in the urban informal sector, b-ct  between
0.7 to 1 percent in agriculture  and the urban formal sector, which reflects here
essentially  changes  in private  activity.  ,The impact  on agricultural  output
tends to grow slightly over time, as a result of the gradual fall in agricultural
wages,  as noted earlier.
28As  implied  by equation  (38),  the level  of e.Fort of skilled workers  changes  as a result
of variations  in the  skilled  unemployment  rate.  H1owever,  given the  magnitude  of these
variations,  and  the elasticity  of the  effort  function  with  respect  to  relative  wages,  the
impact  on the supply of skilled labor  is negligible  relative to the baseline.
29Note  that this analysis of the growth  effects of a cut  in the minimum  wage  does not
account for the possible negative externality that may arise if such a cut reduces incentives
for human capital accumulation,  as emphasized  by Cahuc and Michel  (1095).
38On the fiscal  side, tax revenue  falls by about  0.2 percentage  points as  a
share  of GDP  during  the adjustment  period,  mostly  as  a result  of indirect
taxes  changing  at  a slower  pace than nominal  GDP.  Because  public invest-
ment  falls  by  about  0.1  percentage  points  of GDP  (reflecting  a lower  price
of capital,  that is, because  PK = PV3,  a fall in the value added price in the
urban private  formal sector),  the increase  in the  overall deficit  is about  0.1
percent  of GDP.  This  deficit is financed  by domestic  borrowing.  From the
aggregate balance between investment and savings, and given the closure rule
discussed earlier, this means that the savings  rate of capitalists and rentiers
has to increase to maintain equilibrium.  Given the small size of that group
(about  3 percent of the total number  of households),  this increase turns out
to be quite large-between  5.8 and 6.6 percentage points in the long run.30
Despite relatively  large  changes  in real  consumption  and disposable  in-
come  (mostly in urban  areas),  overall  poverty  indicators  for the rural  and
urban sectors change  relatively little during the adjustment  period.  This is,
of course,  related  to the fact that  the aggregate  growth  and  income effects
of the shock  are fairly  limited  and  involve  essentially  a re-allocation  of re-
sources  across  sectors.  In addition,  however,  there are significant  differences
among  household  groups  within  the urban  sector.  In particular,  although
real consumption of the capitalists-rentiers  group drops significantly,  and the
incidence of poverty  (as  measured  by the consumption-based  headcount  in-
dex)  increases slightly  toward  the end  of the adjustment  period,  the  depth
of  poverty  (as  measured  by  the  poverty  gap)  is  barely  affected  in  either
the  short  or  the  long  run.  By  contrast,  income-based  poverty  indicators
barely  change.  This difference  in behavior  of the two  sets  of indicators  is,
of course, related to the fact that the savings  rate of capitalists  and rentiers
is endogenously  determined,  thereby affecting directly expenditure patterns,
rather than the level of income  (see  (75)).  For unskilled  workers  engaged  in
the informal  and  formal sectors,  both measures of poverty  indicate  a slight
improvement  in the longer  run,  regardless  of whether  the consumption-  or
income-based  measure  is  used.  This  is  also  the  case  in the  short run  for
informal  sector workers.  However,  for unskilled workers in the formal sector,
poverty  increases  slightly on impact-by about  0.1  percentage  points when
the income-based  headcount  index  is used-and  so does  the skilled poverty
30It is worth noting that,  if instead a  "classical  closure"  had  been chosen  (with private
investment determined  residually),  the government  deficit would have had a direct crowd-
ing out  effect on  private  capital  formation.  See,  for  instance,  the discussion  by Agenor
and El Aynaoui  (2003)  of the case of Morocco  in a similar  setting.
39rate  in  the  longer  run.  There  is  therefore  a  potential  trade-off  emerging
between  unemployment  and  poverty:  although  the  reduction  in the  mini-
mum wage raises unskilled employment  in the formal sector, it also  mncreases
poverty  (albeit  slightly)  in the short  term  for that category  of households,
whereas  the poverty rate for skilled  workers in the formal  sector r.ses  both
in the short  and the long run.  Changes  in the consumption-base& Gii co-
efficient  indicate that income distribution  is  effected  quite significantly  by a
cut  in the minimum wage;  the  degree  of inequality  falls  by  more than one
percentage point in the long run.  This effect  is  directly related to the sharp
reduction in consumption experienced by capitalists and rentiers,  .elative  to
other household  groups.
3.2  Out  2ln  PayroHR tas  an  U  k%lild1 laba:r
The simulation results  associated  with a permanent,  5  percentage-point  re-
duction  in the payroll  tax rate  on unskilled  labor are  illustrateed  in  Tables
3  to 8.  The results  correspond  to three  alternative  budget  financing  rules:
domestic  borrowing  (that  is,  an  endogenous  adjustment  in the capitalists-
rentiers savings  rate,  as in the previous  case) with no offsetting t?x change;
an offsetting,  revenue-neutral  increase in sales taxes on private forraal sector
goods  only; and a revenue-neutral  increase in income taxes.31
3.2O  . EDomestic  E1orc>winng
Consider  first the case of domestic  borrowing  (7ables 3 and 4).  Tne impact
effect  of a reduction  in the payroll tax rate  is qualitatively  similez  to a cut
in the minimum wage,  as  discussed earlier:  by reducing the effectfve  cost of
unskilled labor, it tends to increase immediately the demand for that category
of labor-in the present  case  by 3.4  percent  in the first  year,  anc  by about
the same  amount on average  during the adjustment  period.  Thie unskilled
unemployment  rate drops  by  2.2 percentage  points in the first year  as well,
and in the long run by  an average  of  1.4  percent.  And the reduction  in the
31A  potential problem with these simula-tions, as in othex studies along the same line-
such  as Dreze et al.  (1984)-is  the failure to distinguish  between changes in  average tax
rates, and changes in margznal tax rates.  The effects could be very different.  .Por instance,
a reduction  in  the average payroll tax rate  might reduce  "wage-push"  press-as, whereas
a cut  in  marginal  rates  might  reduce  the  unemployment  cost  of achieving  a  higher  net
income,  thereby influencing  trade unions'  bargaining strategies.
40"effective"  cost  of unskilled  labor  leads  firms  in the  private  formal  urban
sector to substitute away  from skilled labor and physical  capital,  leading to
a reduction  in skilled  wages  in nominal terms  (by  1.4 percent  in  period  1,
2.5  percent  in period  2,  1.9 percent  in period  3,  and  1.1  percent  in period
4)  and  a reduction  in the  price  of capital  (that  is,  the price  of the private
formal good) by about  1.2 percent  on impact.  In the present  case,  however,
the skilled nominal  wage  falls  by more than the price  of value  added  in the
private  formal sector (which  drops by  1.2 percent  in period 1, 2.1  percent in
period 2,  1.4 percent in period 3, and 0.7 percent in period 4),  implying a fall
in the  skilled  product  wage  and stimulating  the  demand  for that  category
of labor.  Thus, the  adverse impact  of the substitution effect  induced by the
reduction  in the  cost of unskilled  labor  on the  demand  for  skilled  labor  is
dampened.  Overall, skilled employment  falls by about 0.1 percent on impact
and 0.2 percent  in the longer run, bringing with it a concomitant  increase  in
the skilled unemployment  rate.
The  behavior  of  the  (expected)  urban-rural  wage  differential  follows  a
pattern  qualitatively  similar  to  the  one  described  in  the  previous  experi-
ment,  although  the  magnitude  of the  initial  effects  are  not  as  large.  The
expected  formal-informal  wage  differential,  however,  increases now  in the
second  period.  The reason  is that the  minimum wage  does  not change  this
time around,  and the increase in unskilled employment  raises the probability
of finding a job in the private sector,  thereby increasing  the expected  formal
sector  wage.  As  a result,  therefore,  there is  an  increase  in the number  of
unskilled  job  seekers  in  the  formal  economy  (by  0.6  percent  in  period  2),
which therefore mitigates the initial reduction in unemployment.  In the sub-
sequent period,  however, because of the sharp increase  in the informal sector
wage  (itself due to the reduction in labor supply in the  informal economy),
the formal-informal  wage  differential moves  in the opposite direction and by
about the same amount  (1.8 percentage  points)-thereby reducing the num-
ber of unskilled job seekers in the formal sector.  These fluctuations in wage
differentials,  migration  flows,  and  labor  supply  in the formal  and  informal
sectors  continue throughout the adjustment  period.
The overall effect  on aggregate real output is,  again, fairly  small-given
that this is also a shock that fundamentally  entails a change in relative prices
as the initial impulse (in both cases,  a change in the relative price of unskilled
labor).  An important  feature of the long-run  adjustment  process,  however,
is  a  reduction  in the  size  of  the  informal  sector  and  an  expansion  of  the
private  formal  urban  sector,  which  essentially  results  from  the transfer  of
41unskilled  labor  across these  two sectors.  This result  is therefore  consistent
with the. widely-held  view  (discussed in the introduction)  that reducing the
tax burden on the formal sector is essential to limit the growth of the informal
sector,  although in the present case the  "disincentive'  effects of taxation are
indirect  and captured  at the  level of firms,  and  do  not  account  explicitly
for  the propensity  to  evade  income  taxes  by  individuals.  The government
budget  is  of  course  more  significantly  affected,  with  indirect  tax  revenue
falling by about 0.4 percentage  points of GDP. Despite the drop in the price
of capital  (which tends to raise the desired capital stock, as implied by (78)),
the drop in profits-resulting from the reduction in private consumption  by
capitalists  and rentiers,  and  to a lesser extent  by  skilled households  in the
formal sector-private  investment drops significantly  in the first  2-3 periods
following the shock, recovering partly thereafter.  Because the current account
improves  (by about  0.6 percentage  points  of GDP in the long run),  private
capital inflows fall.  Despite the initially large reduction in private investment,
borrowing  by the government  and the reduction in foreign savings lead to a
fairly significaiit increase in the savings  rate of capitalists-rentiers  relative to
its baseline value (about 8 percentage points during the adjustment period).
Poverty and distributional indicators  are affected in the same direction as
before.  In particular,  after increasing  during the first part of the adjustment
period,  the consumption-based  headcount  index for  capitalists  and rentiers
shows a slight increase toward the end of the adjustment period, whereas the
poverty gap barely changes.  And because the drop in consumption  for that
category  of households  is  larger than in  the case  of a cut  in the minimum
wage,  the degree of inequality  (as measured  by the consumption-based  Gini
coefficient  or the Theil index)  falls  by a larger  amount.  In addition,  in the
present  case, the poverty rate for unskilled  households  in the formal sector
drops on impact,  with no significant long-run effect,  whereas skilled poverty
rates increase  throughout the adjustment  period.
3.2.2  Revenue-Neutral  Change
Consider  now the case where the effect of the cut in payroll taxes on overall
tax revenue  is  offset  by either  an increase  in sales  taxes  on  private  formal
sector goods  (Tables  5  and  6)  or  an increase  in income taxes  (Tables  7  and
8).  In the latter case, the increase in the tax rate is assumed to be propor-
tional across all households-except  of course for informal sector households,
who are  not subject  to  direct taxation  to begin  with.  Put differently,  the
42offsetting  effect  in both  cases  implies  a  constant  level  of total tax revenue,
after  accounting  for general equilibrium  effects.
In both  cases,  the impact  and longer-run  effects  of the shock  are  quali-
tatively similar  to those described  earlier,  although their magnitude  differs.
In particular,  movements  in the  informal  sector  wage  are less  pronounced,
in part  because changes in rural-urban  migration flows are not as large.  By
contrast  (or,  rather,  by  implication),  movements  in  the  expected  formal-
informal  wage differential  during the first part of the adjustment  period are
larger,  implying  more pronounced  movements  in the number  of job seekers
in the formal sector.  Compared to the case of private sector borrowing,  the
reduction  in  the  unskilled  unemployment  rate  is  less  pronounced  with  an
offsetting  change  in the  sales tax,  and of  about  the same  magnitude  when
the income tax is adjusted,  with also similar effects on overall real GDP and
private investment.  When the sales tax is adjusted,  the fall in total private
consumption  is more  pronounced than in the case of domestic  borrowing  or
with an offsetting adjustment in the income tax (see Table 5).  The reason, of
course,  is that the increase in the sales price reduces the purchasing  power of
income  (everything  else equal)  and tends to reduce demand,  particularly  in
urban  areas  (see Table  6).  In both cases, the offsetting  changes in the bud-
get imply that domestic borrowing by the government  does not change  as a
result  of the reduction  in the payroll  tax;  thus,  the increase  in the  savings
rate of capitalists  and rentiers  is much  less pronounced that  in the case  in
which the government finances  its deficit through the private sector.
In both cases,  changes  in the poverty and distributional effects  (as mea-
sured by the consumption-based  indicators)  are also less pronounced initially
than in the case  of a non-neutral  shock,  although the income-based  poverty
gap for  formal  skilled workers  displays  slightly  larger  and  more  persistent
fluctuations  in the  case  of  an  offsetting  income  tax  change  (see  Table  8).
This  is obviously  what one  would  expect  given that disposable  income  for
this particular  group  falls by  a much larger  amount  compared  to the  non-
neutral  case-by  about  2  percent  for  skilled  workers  in  the formal  sector
between periods 6 and 10 (see Table 8),  compared to about 0.8 percent with
a non-neutral  policy shock  (see Table 4).  As a result, the income-based  Gini
coefficient  falls by more (by about 0.4 percentage points in the long run, com-
pared  to 0.2  in the non-neutral  case),  despite  the  fact  that  changes  in the
consumption-based  measures of inequality  are less pronounced.  Overall, the
results indicate  that there are  some significant  differences  in economic  and
poverty  outcomes,  depending  on the offsetting  change  in the budget  that
43accompanies  the reduction in the payroll tax.
4  (CaU$CS$
The purpose of this paper has been to present the structure of  fir.-7MPA,
a  specialized  version  of  the  Integrated  Macroeconomic  Model  f.or  Poverty
Analysis  developed  by  Ag6nor,  Izquierdo  and  Fofack  (2003),  and  Ag6nor,
Fernandes,  Haddad  and van der Mensbrugghe  (2003),  w.hich  is particularly
suitable  for users  interested  mainly  in assessing  the quantitative  efects  of
fiscal  and labor  market  reforms  on  unemployment  and  poverty.  Although
Mini-IMMPA  focuses only on the "real"' side, it offers a more detailed treat-
ment  of the  labor  market  than  KMMPA.  (by  accounting  for  features  such
as  public  education,  employment  subsidies,  and  firing  ccsts)  &nd  the tax
structure.  The first  part  of the  paper  described  in detail  the st7ucture  of
Mini-IMMPA.  In the second part the model was used to analyze the growth,
unemployment  and poverty effects  of two  types  of labor  market  policies:  a
cut in the minimum  wage and a reduction in the payroll tax rate on unskilled
labor.  In particular,  the results  (which  arc  obviously highly  dependent  on
the selected  closure  rule)  indicated that a reduction  in the mi-mmum  wage
may have a sizable impact on unskilled unemployment,  and that the extent
to which a reduction in payroll taxes on usllaed labor lower une.mployment
for that category of labor depends on how they are financed.  More generally,
the foregoing  analysis  suggests  th2at the fiscal  implications  of labor  market
reforms  have  to  be  carefully  analyzed  'n  order  to assess  the  potential  im-
pact of these reforms  on unemployment  and poverty.  Labor mairket  rerorms
may end  up having  a  limited overall  elfect  on  unemployment  and poverty,
depending on how they are financed.
Another  important  implication  of tae roregoing  analysis-which  is  dis-
cussed in more detail in Agenor (2C03a)-is thaSt labor rnark-et reKrms aimed
at reducing unemployment may end up increasing poverty,  if they are imple-
mented  in a context in which fiscal constraints  impose offsetting  changes  in
financing.  Consider,  again, a reduction i-a  payroll taxation on unskilled labor.
Despite stimulating  employment  for that  category  of labor  (as  mentioned
earlier),  this policy measure  may also lead to higher poverty,  depending on
how it is financed.  An offsetting, across-the-board  reduction in transfers,  for
instance,  would  have  an  immediate  adverse  effect  on the poor.  Financing
through an  increase  in  consumption  taxes  may  raise the price  of the  con-
44sumption  basket  of the  poor and  reduce their  real  income  to a level  below
the poverty line.  Financing through higher income taxes may reduce dispos-
able income  and the  ability to spend;  it may  also drive  over  time activity
underground,  leading to a fall  in the overall  tax ratio, which  in turn could
force cuts in expenditure  (including transfers to the most needy).  Financing
through  a tax on capital  (usually a limited option  for  governments,  due to
concerns about capital flight) may lower private investment capital; as noted
earlier this may reduce skilled employment  and mitigate the overall,  positive
effect  on total employment.  Finally,  financing through a cut in government
spending on infrastructure may affect aversely the overall productivity of pro-
duction factors in the private sector (including labor) and lead to a reduction
in wage  income;  it may also have  a negative  impact on private investment.
This,  in turn,  will  have  an  adverse  overall  effect  on the demand  for  labor
(due to the negative  effect  of investment  on growth)  as  well  as  an adverse
effect on the demand for skilled labor through the complementarity  relation-
ship between  human capital and physical  capital.  Thus,  although the direct
effect  of the reduction  in the payroll  tax rate  on the demand  for  unskilled
labor may well be positive (both in the short and medium run),  overall em-
ployment  (and thus  unemployment)  may not  change  much,  as  an increase
in the number  of unskilled jobs is offset  by lower  employment  of skilled la-
bor.  In all  of those cases,  again,  unemployment  may  fall, but poverty may
increase-because  of adverse  effects on income,  due either to lower after-tax
wages or lower  public transfers.  There may therefore  be a trade-off  between
unemployment  and poverty  goals.
In addition,  of course,  labor market  reforms  may themselves  be comple-
mentary,  if labor market institutions are complementary  as well.  As empha-
sized by Coe and Snower  (1997),  this implies that partial or piecemeal labor
market  reforms  are unlikely to achieve  significant  and persistent reductions
in unemployment rates or poverty.  For instance,  active labor market policies
(such as retraining schemes) may not be very effective in the presence of sub-
stantial passive  policies  (such  as stringent job security  provisions).  Reform
programs must be sufficiently broad (in the sense of covering a wide range of
complementary  policies)  and deep  (of substantial magnitude)  to have much
of an effect.  In addition,  these reforms  may also  need to be combined  with
measures  that  address  more  efficiently  the  distributional  objectives  of the
pre-reform  policies,  such as the imposition of high minimum wages.
The  Mini-IMMPA  prototype  developed  here  can be  used  to analyze  a
variety of additional labor market policies.  First, it can be used to analyze a
45reduction  in union bargaining pawer.  To the extent that this translates into
lower  wages  for  skilled workers,  this may afect  incentives  to ac3iuire  skills.
As noted by Lindbeck and Snower (2001),  firing  costs can increase a union's
bargaining power,  and help to explain excessive real wages and resultant  in-
voluntary unemployment.  Second, the model can be used to analyze changes
in employment  subsidies for unskilled labor.  ln general, the employment  ef-
fects of an increase in employment  subsidies and reductions in payroll taxes
are different,  as can be inferred from the results of Pisauro  (1909)  and Ras-
mussen  (1998).  Third,  one could  study the impact  of a reductica  in public
unskilled employment in the production of government services,  coupled with
a deficit-neutral  increase in subsidies to u-nskilled  employment  in the private
formal sector.32
The prototype presented in this paper can also be extended in a variety of
directions.  First, to the extent thaat  patL  o47 the job problem is a shortage of
skilled workers, the model can be extended  to account  for subsidies to skills
acquisition  and/or  on-the-job  training.  Second,  labor  taxation  and  labor
market  regulations  may encourage  firms to go informal.33 This is  captured
only indirectly  in the present  version of the model.  But  changes  in income
taxes  may  have  a direct  effect  on the  prope.-sity  to go  informal;  account-
ing for this  effect  may lead  to an inverted  U-shape  curve  between  taxation
and the size  of the informal  sector,  depending  on the  use of tax revenues.
Suppose,  for instance, that revenues  are used to finance higher spending  on
infrastructure.  An increase  in inzome  taxes may well  have  a ocsitive  effect
on growth initially  (by stimulating  private  production),  but  a negative  ef-
fect  afterward,  as further  increases  tend to  drive activity  underground  and
reduce  overall  revenue.  Finally, the  model  caTn  be extended to consider the
impact of the introduction of social insurance on savings,  labor supply,  and
unemployment.34
32Several  of these  shocks  are  analyz^d  by  Ag6nor,  Nabli,  Yusef,  and  Ecyniung  (2003),
in a variant of the present  model.  Note that a meaningful  analysis of public employment
and wage  shocks requires the introduction  of a oroduction  function for pubL;c services,  in
order to break the equality  between  the wage  bill and the production  of value added.
33See for instance  Sarte  (2000)  or 'hi-ig  and Moe  (2001)  for  a  model  wit& transitional
dynamics,  and Schneider  and Enste  (2000)  for a more general  discussion.  KXugler  (2000)
develops  a  model  in  which job security  regulations  provide  incentives  for nigh  turnover
firms to operate in the informal  sector.
34See Karni  (1999)  for a thorough discussion of analytical issues  in the design of unem-
ployment  benefit  schemes.
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Equations  of Mini-IMMPA
PRODUCTION
4
Xi = V, +  E  a.lXl  (Al)
i=1
V, =  [o.xi{I3x 1 uPx1 +  (1 -,fx3)KGPx1}  PX1 ]  (A2)
XI  CtED 1 [1ED, El  +  (1  - 3EDI)Dl  PED  (A3)
4
X 2 =  V2 + Z  a 2 2X2 (A4)
X=1
V2 =  Ux2  (A5)
4
X 3 =  V3 +  E  a23X3 (A6)
JL(S3, K3)  =  aX 3L 0X,LS3 +  (1 - OX3L)K3  3L]  PX3L  (A7)
JH(JL, U3)  =  CX3H{fX 3HJL  +  (1  -)fX 3H)U3  3  }PX3H  (A8)
V3(JH, KG) =  °X3 [3X 3 JPX3 +  (1-3X3){  d }cPX3]  (A9)
X3 =  3]ED 3[/ED 3E3  )DP  (A10)
X 4 = V 4 +  E  at4X4 (All)
t=1
V4 =  (WUGU4 +  WSGS4)/PV4  (A12)
WAGES  AND EMPLOYMENT
I1+ 1PI  - ,7x1 o 3x, 1 +
Uld =  {V  1 W7X  .XI  (A13)
47UR =  U (V1  PTWi)  (A14)
UR = UR-1(i  +  gR) - MIG  (A15)
We  =  OUVM,-1  +  (1  - OU)71X2 2,-1 (A16)
PUU,-1
ou =  U3S-l  _U41(A17)
W  =  '  (A18)
MIG  Gj~~I  (A19)
UR,-1  (We  3
(P  P  (+XsH  17X 3H
U ~  FUJH  -PU-I  E(A20)
/3,l  \PUU,-l
U; = UF,-  Pb  - vjD  >GF  (A22)
UNEu1  U-  (U 4 )  (A23)
29  =6  U  UF  (@A24)
qX  ( p VP7  W )  (A25)
U2
UU = UU,-I (1 + gu) + MIG - SKL  (A26)
URB = UU + S  (A27)
Wi = wP  = UG,M  (A28)
vvzg  =wSGPUs  (A29)
S3  =  JL  X3L  |  (A30)
(/S  aX 3L
48UNEj-1  f-02  03
WS=  PUS1 - V/(l  - (A31X)
1-IJ  L)1+Px3L  3L
WS  PLb  -UNE;"l  (X,  -3  fS  (A32)
I.  X3L 
UNES =1-  (S3+  SG)  (A33)
S
SG = S 4 +  SGE  (A34)
S = (1 - 5s)S-l + SKL  (A35)
SKL = [3E(PSGE)PE  +  (1  - E)KEPE]  PE1  (A36)
{1+  [  (1-UNESi)Ws]}  -1  (A37)
1  [(-  UNEs,-1)Ws,-1g  (A38)
SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND
X2 = Qs  (A39)
X4 =  Qs  (A40)
1= aQ 1{/Q1M 1~Q' +(1-  Q.)D-PQ1  PQl  (A41)
Q`  =  aQ 3{Q 3M 3 P3  +  (1  - Q 3 )D  3 }Q3  (A42)
Q  = C±+INT 1,  fori=1,2,4  (A43)
Q  = C3 + G3 +  Z3 + INT3 (A44)
4
INT=Z  aaXZ,  for j=1,...4  (A45)
G3 = GC +  ZG  (A46)
C1h =  X,h  +  CCh(COh  - ,= 1 PCX,h)  (A47)
PC,
49Ci =T>C,h,  i=L,.......  (A48')
h
Z3 =  ZP  (A49)
El  =  PE  iEl  |-r  3T  aT'  (A5,0
E3  = (:E3 . L  3)UT3  (A51)
D3  PD3  1T 3 I
Ml  = DI  P)D,  3Q-  )  (A52)
M 3 = D 3 :(j p3  I  ¾-3)  (A53)
PRCES
4
Pi=  Vi-l  PX 1(1-atxc)-  aj,iPC.  jXi  fori=1, ...  . (A54)
PE, = wpe1ER  (A55)
PE 3 =  Wp83ER  (A55)
PM1 =  wp 1 n, (1 +  itm )ER  (A57)
PM 3 =  wUW3 (a -+ itm 3)ER  (A58)
PXJ =  P 1D1 +  PE1 E1 (A59)
pX  3  =  ?D3D 3 +  PE3E3 (A60)
PQ1 =  FMPM  +  1 DPD,  (A61)
PC 1 = (1  +  stxl),PQ 1 (A62)
PQ3  = M 3PM3 + D 3PD 3 (A63)
PQ 3 =~~~~~
PC3 = (!  +  SiX3 ).PQ 3 (A64)
PQ2 =  PD2 =  PX 2 = PC2 (A65)
50PQ 4 = PD4 =  PX4 = PC4 (A66)
PJ  PL JL +  [(1 + ptxu)WM-ESU]U3 (A67)
JH
pJ  PR3 + WSS3 (A68)
JL
PK  = PC 3 (A69) z
PR =  O  9XPQ1  (A70)
i
PUU=  ZOpCi,  PUS=  LOisPCi  (A71)
~~~~~~~~~~~t
INCOME
PR1 = PV1V1 - W1U1 (A72)
PR2 = PV2V2 - W 2U2 (A73)
PR3 = PV3(V 3 - FC) - [(1 + ptxu) WM  - ESu]U3 - WsS3 (A74)
FC  = fu max(O, U3,_1 - U3) + fs max(O,  S3, 1 - S3)  (A75)
YHa = PV1Vi + -yTR  (A76)
YHb  = PV2V2 +  YbTR  (A77)
YHC = WMU3 + WUGU4 +  PV3fu max(O, U3, 1 - U3)  +  -yeTR  (A78)
YHd = WSS 3 +  WSGSG + PV 3fs maX(O, S3,- 1 - S3)  +  YdTR  (A79)
NPR3 = (1 - itxf)PR3 - i*ER -FL3,  l  (A80)
YH,  =  (1-  X)NPR3 + ,yTR  (A81)
SAVh  = srh(l - itXh)YHh  (A82)
COh =  (1  - srh)(1 -itXh)YHh  (A83)
= PR3 (1 - itxf)  (A84)
PK  i* +  63 -APK/PK,-1
ZP  Z  K  *  erZ 4P  = Zo  3  }  (A85)
K3,-1  K3,-l
K3 =  K 3,- 1(1 - 63)  +  ZP,- 1 (A86)
51PKZp = XNPR3 + E  SAVp,  + GBAL + ER(AFL3 + AFLc)  (A87)
h
NW3 = NW3,-1 + PKAK 3 - ER -AFL 3 +  APKK3,-1  (A88)
GBAL = TAX - TR - WsGSG  - ESuU3  - PC3(Gc + ZG) - iER  *  FLG,-1
(A89)
TAX  =  ,  itm2(ER -wpmiMi) +PtxUWMU 3 + itxfPR 3 (ADO)
i=1,3
4
+  Z  atx:PXiXi +  E  itXHh  +  stxiPQQ,
i=l  h  i=1,3
ZG = IR + IE  + IH  (A91)
Kj  = Kj,(I-  6,)  + 4j,-,,  j  = E, H, R  (A92)
KG =  aYG{1GKR`  +  (1 -) 3 G)KH  C}  PG  (A93)
3BALANCE  F  PAY  TS
Z  (wpeiE, - wpmnMi)  - i°(FLG,- 1 + FL 3,_1 ) + AFLG + AFL3 0  (A94)
i=1,3
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AVC3 Average variable  cost in private production
C,h  Consumption of good i by household  h
C.  Aggregate  consumption  of good i (by  all households)
COh  Total consumption by household  h
D,  Domestic demand for good i = 1, 3
E.,  Exports of good i = 1, 3
ESu  Nominal  employment  subsidy on unskilled labor
FC  Total firing costs
fs  Real firing cost per skilled worker
fu  Real firing cost per unskilled worker
G3  Government  spending on private urban goods
GBAL  Overall government fiscal  balance
IK  After-tax rate of return on private physical capital
INTi  Intermediate  good demand for good i
JH  Composite  input from JL and unskilled labor
JL  Composite  input from capital and skilled labor
KE  Public capital in education
KG  Stock of public capital  (infrastructure  and health)
KH  Public capital in health
KR  Public capital in infrastructure
K3 Private physical  capital
K3*  Desired stock of private physical capital
Ml  Imports of good i = 1, 3
mS  Marginal product  of a skilled worker  in private production
MIG  Rural-urban  migration  flows
NPR3 Net  (after-tax)  profits of private urban formal sector firms
NW3 Net worth of private urban formal sector firms
Qs  Unemployment  benefit for skilled workers
34The index i (respectively,  h) is used below to refer to all production sectors (household
groups, respectively),  that is, 1,  2, 3, 4 (a, b,  c, d, e, respectively),  unless otherwise indicated.
53'p  Productivity  of public  sector workers in education
Wpm  Minimum effort  level of Public sector workers  in education
PR  Rural price index
PC,  Tax-inclusive  domestic  sales price of good i =  1, 3
PD,  Domestic price of domestic sales of good  i
PE,  Export  price for good i = 1, 3
PK  Price of capital
PMi  Import  price for gcod i = 1,  3
PQi  Composite  price of good i
PR,  Profits by firms produci-ng  good  i
PHJ  Price of JH
PLJ  Price of JL
Pus  Urban skilled price  index
Puu  Urban unskilled price in6ex
P14  Value added price of good  i
PXi  Gross  output price of good i
Qid  Aggregate demand. for  good i
Qis  Quantity supplied of good  i
S  Stock of skilled worlkers
S3  Skilled labor employed in the private urban formal sector
S5T  Union's  skilled employment  target
SAVh  Saving by householc  h
srh  Saving rate for household  h
SKL  Change in the number of skilled workers
TR  Public transfers to households
TAX  Total tax revenues
TVC3 Total variable costs in prIvate urban production
Uh  Stone-Geary  utility function  for household  h
Ui  Unskilled labor employed in sector  i
UF  Unskilled labor supply ir the urban formal sector
UR  Unskilled  workers in rural sector
Uu  Total supply of anskilled workers in the urban sector
Uid  Demand for labor  in sector i =  1, 2,3
U28  Supply of labor iz the informai sector
UR,  Labor supply in the rural sector
UNEu  Unskilled unemployment  rate in the urban formal sector
UNES  Skilled unemployment  rate
'541URB  Total urban population  (skilled and  unskilled)
VI  Value added in sector i
WI  Nominal wage in sector i =  1, 2
W,  Real wage rate in sector i = 1, 2
WA  e  Expected rural consumption  real wage
A  Expected real  wage in the formal economy
wl  e  Expected real wage in the informal  economy
w  e  Expected  unskilled  urban real wage
WM  Minimum  wage  (nominal terms)
Ws  Nominal skilled wage in the private formal sector
WS  Real skilled wage in the private formal sector
WSC  Consumption real wage
WCT  Union's real consumption  wage target
WSG  Nominal skilled wage in the public sector
WSG  Real skilled wage in the public sector
WUG  Nominal unskilled wage in the public sector
XCth  Subsistence  level  of consumption of good i by household  h
X.,  Gross production  of good i
YHh  Income  of household  h
Y2  Average income in the informal sector  (before  transfers)
ZG  Real public  investment expenditure




atxi  Indirect taxation rate of output in sector i
E  Rate of depreciation  of the nominal exchange rate
ER  Nominal exchange rate
FL0 Foreign borrowing  'by govern-ment
FL3 Foreign borrowing  by private urban  formal firms
Gc  Goverinent  cor-smptioz  (excluding wages  and salaries)
gR  Population  growth in rural sector
gu  Population growth in urban sector
i*  Interest  rate on private foreign  borrowing
iG  Interest  rate paid on public foreign borrowing
IE  Public investment  in education
IH  Public investment  in health
IR  Public investment  in infrastructure
itkf  Corporate income tax rate
itXh  Income tax rate for household  h
mk  Markup rate,  private urban formal firms
ptxu  Payroll tax rate on  unskilled laoor, private formal  urban sector
x  Rate of retained net profits,  private formal  urbian  sector
54  Skilled workers  in productio.  of  nubic services
SG  Total number of skilled  workers  in the public sector
SGE  Skilled workers in poublic production of education
stx,  Sales tax rate on good i (sMX2 = O)
tmi,  Import tariff on good i =  ,  3
U4 Unskilled  workers in public sector
wpe2  World  price of exports, i = 1,  3
wpmi  World price of imports, i =  7, 3Parameters
Name  Definition
in text
a,j  Input-output  coefficients
aeG  Shift parameter  for public capital
aEQ,  Shift parameter in composite  good i =  1, 3
CrED1  Shift parameter in agricultural  production function
aED3  Shift parameter in CET function for private  formal urban good
ax.  Shift parameter in production of i = 1, 3
aX3H  Shift parameter in unskilled,  skilled/capital  composite input
(YX3L  Shift parameter in skilled/capital  composite input
1 3E  Weighting parameter  in the skills acquisition function
fG  Shift parameter  for public capital
fQ%  Shift parameter in composite  good i = 1, 3
OED1  Shift parameter in agricultural  production function
OED3  Shift parameter  in CET function for private  formal urban good
13xi  Shift parameter in production of good i = 1, 3
fX3H  Share parameter in unskiUed,  skilled/capital  composite  input
1X3L  Share parameter  in skilled/capital  composite input
CCih  Shares of good i in household  h's total consumption
dc3 Congestion parameter,  private formal urban good
63  Depreciation  rate of private capital
6E  Depreciation  rate of public capital in education
6H  Depreciation rate of public capital in health
6R  Depreciation rate of public capital in infrastructure
Es  Rate of depreciation  or  "de-skilling"  of the skilled labor force
1lxi  Coefficient  of returns to scale
7lX2  Parameter  in the value added function for urban informal good
'Yh  Share of public transfers  allocated to household  h
¢3  Parameters  in skilled target wage equation, j  = 1, 2,3
PE  Parameter  in the skills acquisition function
PG  Substitution parameter  for public capital
pQ,  Substitution parameter in composite good i = 1, 3
PED1  Parameter  in agricultural  production function
PED3  Substitution  parameter between exports  and domestic  sales
Px1 Substitution parameter in production of good  i = 1, 3
57PX3H  Substitution parameter between unskied,  and
skilled/capital  comxposite input
PX3L  Substitution parameter between skilled labor- private capital
UF  Elasticity of unskilled labor flows with respect to t7ne expected
formal-informal wage differential
am  Elasticity of migration flows to rural-urban wage dierentials
aQi  Elasticity of compcsite good i = 1, 3
aEDi  Elasticity of transformation  between expoxrs and domestic
sales, i =  1,  3
'X3H  Elasticity of substitution between  unskilled workers
and composite input of silled workers and private capital
aX3L  Elasticity of substitutionT  etween skilled workers-private  capital
Cz  Parameter  in the investment function for the priveae sector
ou  Share of urban unskilled workers employed in formal sector
aOR~  Weight  of good i in the price idex of the rural sector
i5  Weight of good i iin the  ioce index  for ur-ban skiled  workers
Azu  Weight of good i  -iz  the pTice  index for urban unskied workers
v  Weight of wage deviations  in Union's utility funcLon
ZO  Shift parameter in the investment  function in the private sector
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Calibration and Parameter Values
This appendix presents the characteristics of the data underlying the cal-
ibration  procedure  for the  Mini-IMMPA  prototype  described  in the text.35
The  basic data set consists  of a Social Accounting  Matrix  (SAM)  and a set
of initial  levels and  lagged  variables.  The mapping  between  Mini-IMMPA
variables and the SAM data framework is set out in Table Cl.  The SAM  en-
compasses  27 accounts including production  and retail  sectors  (4 accounts),
labor production  factors  and profits  (3  accounts),  enterprises  (1  account),
households  (5  accounts),  government  current expenditures  and taxes  (9  ac-
counts),  government  investment  expenditures  (3  accounts),  private  invest-
ment spending  (1 account),  and the rest of the world  (1  account).  The ac-
tual SAM data are presented  in Table C2.  The data satisfy the double-entry
accounting  principle  and can therefore  be used to initialize  model  variables
and calibrate level parameters,  such as effective  tax rates.
The  characteristics  of the  SAM  data  and  other  data  (including  initial
labor market quantities  and debt and capital stocks)  are summarized in the
following.  On the output  side,  agriculture  and the informal  sector  account
for  respectively  12  and  35  percent  of total  output.  On the  demand  side,
private  current  and  capital  expenditures  account  for  78  percent  of GDP,
whereas  overall government expenditures  account for 18 percent of GDP. The
economy has a balanced current  account but runs a trade surplus, amounting
to 4 percent of GDP, to finance  foreign interest payments.  This structure of
production  and final demand characterize  fairly  well a lower  middle-income
economy  with moderate  potential for agricultural  production.
Total investment  expenditures  amount  to 22  percent  of  GDP,  and  the
private sector  account  for two-thirds  of these outlays.  This implies that in-
vestment  spending  accounts  for  19 percent  of private  expenditures,  and 40
percent  of public  expenditures.  The  public  sector  investment  budget  allo-
cates  30  percent  of expenditures  to investment  in the health sector,  30  per-
cent to investment  in the education sector,  and 40 percent  to investment  in
infrastructure.  Furthermore, the public sector wage bill makes up 30 percent
of overall  public sector expenditures.  In the  base period the government  is
assumed to run a balanced  budget,  and therefore  does not resort to domes-
tic  or  foreign borrowing.  Sales  taxes  and import  tariffs  make  up for more
35This Appendix  was drafted by Henning Jensen.
59than 70  percent  of total  government  revenues,  whereas  private  income  and
corporate taxes account  for less than 20 percent  of revenues.  This structure
of tax revenue  is a common feature  of many  developing  economies,  low-  and
middle-income.
The trade balance is dominated by non-agricultural imports and exports.
Agricultural  exports  account  for  only  8  percent  of total export  earnings,
whereas  non-agricultural  imports  account  for  92  percent  of total  imports.
The level of trade openness, measured  by the ratio of the sum of imports and
exports  to GDP,  amounts to a moderate  40 percent.  Because the economy
runs  a  balanced  current  account  in  the base  period,  there  are  no  private
and  public  foreign  borrowing.  Nevertheless,  the  stock  of external  debt  in
the base  period  amounts  to  51  percent  of  GDP  (or  233  percent  of export
earnings),  whereas  foreign  interest  payments  amount to 4  percent  of  GDP
(or 18 percent of exports earnings).  The hypothetical country considered has
therefore  a significant  debt burden initially.
Looking at the labor market,  29 percent  of the total labor force is living
in rural  areas,  whereas the rest  is concentrated  in urban areas.  Altogether,
47 percent of the workers  are employed in some kind of urban informal occu-
pation, whereas only  22  percent of the labor force is employed  in the urban
formal  sector.  Open  unemployment  among  formal  urban  workers  amounts
to 2  percent  of the total  labor force.  The  formal labor  force consists  of 58
percent of unskilled workers  and 42 percent of skilled workers, and unemploy-
ment rates are 10 percent among formal unskilled labor and 8 percent among
skilled  labor.  Migration  from  rural  to urban areas  amounts to  1.3  percent
of the rural population,  and the urban-rural wage differential  amounts to 54
percent of the rural wage.  In comparison,  unskilled labor migration from the
informal  to the formal sector  amounts to 0.8 percent  of the informal sector
labor  force,  whereas  the  formal-informal  wage  differential  amounts  to  106
percent  of the informal wage.
A set of 17 elasticity parameters has to be estimated  (or "guesstimated"),
as they cannot be derived from the calibration procedure.  These parameters
include  CES substitution  elasticities in rural agricultural  and private formal
production (4 parameters);  CES Armington elasticities and CET transforma-
tion elasticities  for aggregating domestic  composite  goods and transforming
domestic production  (4 parameters);  elasticities  related to rural-urban,  and
formal-informal  sector  migration  (2  parameters);  elasticities  related  to the
computation  of ordinary  and congested  government  capital  (2 parameters),
the elasticity of effort by teachers  and the elasticity  of substitution between
60labor  and  capital  in  skill  upgrading  (2 parameters);  the elasticities  related
to determination  of skilled labor wages  (2  parameters);  and the elasticity of
investment  with respect to the desired  private capital  stock  (1  parameter).
In addition, a set of minimum consumption  levels  (15  parameters)  has to be
determined,  because they cannot  be derived  from the calibration  procedure
either.
The substitution elasticity between labor and government  capital in rural
production is set at 0.7, whereas elasticities in the nested private formal sector
production structure ranges from 0.7 between skilled labor and capital to 1.2
between  the skilled  labor-capital  bundle  and  unskilled  labor.  Import  and
export  elasticities  are  uniformly  set at  0.7  for  agriculture  and  1.5  for the
urban  private formal sector.  This  is again meant  to reflect  a lower  middle-
income economy with low agricultural potential.  The elasticity of rural-urban
migration with respect  to the relative rural-urban  wage-differential  is set  at
0.4,  whereas  the elasticity  of formal-informal  migration  with respect  to the
formal-informal  wage ratio i5 set  at 0.8.
In relation to the computation  of public sector  capital, the substitution
parameter  between  infrastructure  and health  capital  stocks  are set  at  0.5,
whereas  congestion  is assumed to be absent by setting the elasticity to zero.
The substitution elasticity  between  teachers  and public capital  in education
in the production  of skilled labor is  set to 0.3,  whereas  the effort  elasticity
with  respect  to the  relative  wage  ratio  (using  the  specification  in  Agenor
and  Aizenman  (1999)  )  is set  to 0.8.  Furthermore,  skilled  labor  wages  in
the urban private  formal sector is only assumed to be affected  by the skilled
unemployment  rate.  Accordingly,  the private  skilled  wage  elasticity  with
respect  to unemployment  is set at -2.0,  whereas  the elasticity  with respect
to the skilled labor-capital  bundle is assumed to be zero.
Turning to the specification  of private capital formation,  the investment
elasticity with respect to the desired growth rate of the private capital stock
is set  at  0.3.  This  reflects  an  economy  facing  structural  difficulties  in the
process of capital  accumulation.  Finally,  minimum  household  consumption
levels were uniformly assumed to amount to 10 percent of initial good-specific
consumption levels.
Among the remaining set of parameters,  the foreign interest rate on pri-
vate  borrowing  is calibrated  to  3.8 percent,  whereas  the public  foreign  in-
terest  rate is calibrated to 4.9 percent.  In addition,  the initial depreciation
rates  are calibrated to 6.4 percent  for private capital and 3.9-5.8  percent for
public  capital  (depending  on whether  investment  is in education,  health,  or
61infrastructure).  Thrning to the government  budget, output and value added
tax rates  range  from  3.0-3.7  percent,  whereas  the tax rate  on  sa-les  of the
urban  private  formal sector  and the payroll  tax rate paid by firEns  in that
sector  are  calibrated  to  respectively  12.1  and  20.1  percent.  l7mpo:t  tariffs
range from 34 percent on private formal sector goods to 167 percert on agri-
cultural goods, reflecting  a country with si"icant protection on agriculture.
Finally,  the corporate income  tax rate is set  as 7.5 percent, whereas  income
tax rates on households range from 2.2-3.9 percent  for zural agricultural  and
urban  unskilled groups,  to 9.6-12.5  percent  for the urban skilled  group  and
capitalists-rentiers.  As noted in the text, workers in the urban infor-mal sector
do not pay income  taxes.
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74Table 3
Mini4MMPA: Simulation Results
5 Percent Cut In Unskfllod Labor Payroll Tax Rate,  Non Revenue  Neutral
(Percentae  deviations from baseline, unless otherwise Indlcated)
PerIods
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
Real  Secter
Totalresources  01  -02  00  01  00  -0.2  -01  00  00  -01
Gross  domestic pndxuct  02  0 0  01  0.2  01  0 0  01  01  01  0 0
Imports  of goods  and NFS  -06  -15  -10  -04  -07  -11  -10  -0 7  -07  -0  9
Totleopenditure  01  -02  00  01  00  -02  -01  00  00  -01
Totai comumptiOn  00  0.3  02  -0 3  -04  -0.2  -01  -0 2  -0 3  -0 3
Pdvatecosumpoon  00  03  02  -03  -0.5  -0.2  -01  -02  -OA  -03
Pubilc  conumptbon  00  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  00  0 0  0  0  00
Total  nver,tmenl  -0  -3 7  -2  2  0 4  0 0  -16  -17  -0 7  -0 5  -10
PdrelnvestInent  -0  9  -5 0  -2.9  0 7  0 2  -2  0  -21  -0 8  -0  -12
PubticldvIslmont  -08  -09  -07  -04  -06  -07  -07  -06  -06  -06
Euporofi goodsand NFS  1 4  1 5  1  3  1 1  1 3  1  3  1 3  1  2  1.2  1 3
E.temal Sector (%  of GODP)
Cunrentaocount  04  06  05  04  00  08  .e  o  05  06
Expeots  of gOOdS  and  NFS  0 3  0 3  0 3  0.2  0  3  0 3  0 3  0 3  0.3  0 3
Impodt of goodso  an NFS  -02  -0 3  -02  -01  -01  -02  -02  -01  -01  -02
Factor  rsevrJC  0 0  00  00  -01  -01  -01  -01  -01  -01  -02
Capital  account  -04  -0  5  -04  -0  5  0 6  -0  -0 5  -0  5  -0  6
Pdvate  bonroWing  -04  - 6  -05  -04  - 05  -0 6  -0 6  -05  - -0 6
Public  brrowmg  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0  0  00 
Genmmernt Seetor (%  of GOP)'
Totalrenoue  -04  -05  -04  -03  -04  -04  -04  -04  -04  -04
Directtaxes  00  -01  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Indlirecttnos  -04  -00  -04  -03  -03  -04  -04  -03  -03  -04
Totoeirperindllo  -01  -01  -01  -01  -01  00  -01  -01  -01  00
Consumption  00  00  00  00  000  00  00  00  00  00
Invastmstr  -01  -01  -01  0 0  0  0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0  0  0 0
Trnsfers to housholida  0 0  0 0  0 0  00  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  00  0  0
Forlgn Intemsi pooYnits  00  0o  0  0 0  0o  0  0o  0  0 0  0o  0  0 0  0o  0  00 
Total  nancnsig  03  0S  04  03  03  04  04  03  03  03
Foernnf Onandng  0o0  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Domesticbomownlng  03  05  04  03  03  04  04  03  03  03
Ltabo  Market
Norrinal  agesa
Agrculturalsecor  15  14  13  07  04  06  0.7  06  04  04
Intorl  Secltof  17  Zi  2 0  14  19  2 3  21  18  18  2 0
Pdnse formal  ector
Umidiled  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Sidled  -1 4  -2.5  -1 9  1  1  -1 4  -1 9  -1  -1 5  -1 5  -1 7
Public sector
Unsided  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Sililed  00  01  01  00  00  01  01  00  00  01
Employment
Agtradtsi re  ector  00  00  01  01  01  01  01  01  01  01
IniormaloIseclOr  0 0  -0 2  00  -0  2  -04  -04  -0 3  -02  -0 3  -0 4
Pdvalt formel oeetor
Unskilled  34  20  30  40  36  28  30  35  35  32
Sidled  -01  -0 2  -02  -01  -01  -02  -02  -0.1  -01  -02
PubDic  sector
Undidiod  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Skilled  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Labor  supply  (urbsn  fomal Sector)
Unsdled  00  06  00  04  12  12  08  07  10  11
Sidlled  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Unemploymendt  rat  (.rban formal  rts)'
Unskilied  -22  -0 7  -2  0  -2 3  -1 3  -0  -1 3  -1 7  -1  4  -1 1
Silled  01  01  01  01  01  01  01  01  01  01
Real "age  d  _lfeelats  '
Expected  urbnrural (%  of nro  rrag)  00  -1 7  1 2  1 3  -0 7  -0 2  -02  -05  -04  -02
Epectedfonrmal-lnforanel(%ofInfomnalmese)  00  17  -18  11  22  01  -12  -02  08  03
Migration  I
Rurt-urban (%  ofudfban  tabor  supply)  0 00  -0 02  -0  01  -0 1  -0 01  0 00  0 00  0  00  00  0DO0
Formai-nrmal(%Offrormalurbanlborsupply)  000  065  -058  OAI  083  002  -045  -008  028  013
Memorandum  Items'
GOPelmerketpdices  02  -01  01  02  01  00  00  01  01  00
Vahe added at  tforcort  02  01  01  02  01  00  01  01  01  01
Value  added  In  nunrmsctor  00  00  00  01  01  01  01  01  01  01
Value  added  n urban  iodnnal sKetor  0 0  -0 2  0  0  -01  -03  -0 3  -02  -02  -0 3  -0 3
Valumadded  In  urban rmnalsecor  06  03  04  0 6  05  04  04  0  5  05  0 4
PdvtaeConsumption  -03  -01  -01  -06  -0.8  -06  -04  -05  -06  -06
PdsvalllInerettnt  -03  41  -22  12  08  -13  -18  -02  01  -06
Disposable  Income  05  04  0 S  05  05  05  05  0 5  05  0  5
Capotalists  and nrrfsavip ntorS  '  7 5  51  54  87  98  82  73  82  69  8S
'Absolute  denoortin  from  base  line 'real temis
750 Pc-o,zcr  Ctl In Umnt.z-.10zs  Lc4ow Poymf3  Yc= n~_,Nn  02  -
(AtLsocIv~  cdjvtz41o-t  frooo  bc2cl0,  wozt=  Cfl  cmo  tiz-
0  43  0  0  10
Fb.3tlCp  02  0 0  0.6  0.3  0.3  0.4  0 4  0 3  LI2  0.3
LLO=A  CP1  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  W.2  0.3
wlnL~~~~~~~d ~0.3  03  0.3  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.  0.2  02  0.3
Sl74d  0.0  0.1  0 1  00  0.0  0.1  0.  00  0.3  0.1
RcZ1EWCI1  PRt3  .0.3  .0.2  .0.  -0.1  .01I  .01  -01  .0.1  .7,1  4011
Vah0 e",  Pd=o
R~J cV0tL33  1  14  I  1 3  0.7  014  0.0  07  00  04  0.4
Ulbt  3t1b0ml1t21  1.7  2.0  2.0  1 4  1.0  2.3  2.1  1.0  10a  2.0
ulb0  ww:1 2zA  .1.3  .21  .14  .0.7  .10  .1 a  -IA  -1 0  -10  -1.2
L00zp.2n  0.3~c  L  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 0  0 0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Rwr10z140oM3  LI  0.7Y  0.0  0.4  (LI  0.2  04  0.  0.2  0.2
L0lb.-tlO343~  0.4  04  026  00  00  0  0.  0  O  00  0.  0 0
IJ  1 0  103  029  I  1  1  1 2  1  1.3
Fwn,d InC-d  ~~~~1.0  021  41  2.0  17  1.3  1A  17  17  125
Fcmld c%~~~~:g  AT4  .12  -0.0  -0 0  AT.  .0 0  -0 0  -0.7  -0T  -0.
co0_=  drco74o  -I?  .20  .17  A0.  A0.  -1.4  -11  .02  -0.4  -04
FWad  lIfI0..4O14  0.0  0 7  0.0  04  0 1  02  0A  003  02  02
IJlr~ oIlo10.30  -00  -03  .03  -0 0  -10  O.?.  -00  _07  -00  -0.
bbOmld  1.3  1.0  105  020  11  1.0  1.4  1.2  1 1  1.3
FomdrJw.%:  10G  0.0  14  2.0  17  1.I3  1A  17  17  12I
F~~_J  C~~~~~  AT4  -1.3  -00  40  47  0.0  A0D  47  -0.7  .0.
cq,,I:~~~=  c-A  -C=  ~-110a  -0.4  40  .12.0  -13.2  .110  - 10.1  -100a  -11  .10-2D
Rwd  ~~~~~~~~~0  0  0.0  0.1  0.1  01  0.1  0 1  0.1  0.1  0.1
10bm  hc  dtZ1c=  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 0  0.0  0.0  00  0.0  0.0  0.0
0  -030.0  -0  .2MO-04  -04  -024  -023  .0.  3A  .0.4
3.0  0.0,  0.0  04  1.2  1.2  0 0  0.7  1.0  I1I
FolIr-I  CL~~~~~~  .0  0.0  0.0  00  02  0 0  0.0  00  0.0  00
cOc;L  2013740  0 0  0 0  0.0  00,  0.0  0.0  00  0.0  0.0  0.0
Fll-l  ~~~~~~~~0.0  00  0.0  023  00  0A  04  0.3  0.3  03
L0b,i  0.3  0.4  0.3  02  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  02
Rwd hmx=hcld3  4)S~~-0  -OA  -00  -03  0.0  .01  -0.2  .01  -0.1  0.0
lOOc_ It1o-hx  40.  -00  -0.  44l  .0  4  -020  .04  .02  44  43S
b~~~~~wnc,1  -~~~~~~~~~~~~~02  .00  -07  -00  .07  -0 0  .07  40O  2.7  -07
Fem,zl  ~~~~~~.12  0.0  .10  -0 7  .01  0.0  -0I  -0A  41  0.0
PenTcj  Cc:d  ~~~~~0.0  0.0  0 0  0.4  0.3  02  0.3  0.0  0.2  120
Cc7743  old ra2-%3  0.7  0.7  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0
em_~~~~.7  AD~~4  .. 0  -026  .0.0  .03  04W  -0.4  -0.4  .0.3  432
Rwd t=.:N~~~~~~  43  40  -0.2  -0.1  0.0  0.0  -01  -01  0.0  0.0
Uibcn h=r4%l  -0  3  -04  43a  -0.3  -0 3  .0.3  43  -0.3  403  -0 3
01107r4d  44A  40  -0.0  .0.3  .0.4  .00  40a  -04  44  .023
F-d  w=~~~~~~  .0.4  00  a  43  .0.4  .01  0.0  41  432  4  41l
F033:4d  0.1  0.1  0.1  01  01  0.1  01  0 1  0.1  0.1
0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0 1  01I  0.1  0.1  0.1
Oooooow  43~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-  .0.3  -023  -0.2  402  -0.2  43  -0.3  43  -0.2
02Cm 43  -2.0  -17  -10  41  3  4  -13  -12  .1.02D..  1.12
Thz3 wt-,  ~~~~~-1I  -10  -00  -. 12  1.14  -12  .11I  -1.2  -1_3  -13
Flwd  MD~~~~~~~0  0.0  00s  0.3  0.3  04  0O  0.  0.3  0.3
W203  0.2  0.4  0 3  0.2  0.2  0.3  02  02  02  0.2
R.t3703h=.=t0  .02  .04  44  4a2  -01  .0.1  -01  -0.1  41I  ..1
L,b~003:l  0!4  407  40  417  -00  -07  .02G  .07  .00  47  C.02
h?womci  .120  -10  -11  .02  .1I  -13  -1.2  -1I  .11  .1.2
I'031 103740,  44A  00  404  -04  0110  0.0  02  0.0  41l  43
Fci,d dLd  0.2  0 0  I2  0.2  02  00  02  0.4  0.0  OA
cp== c-A  =C=  Ob~~~0. 07  0.7  00  0 0  0.7  0.7  0.7  0 0  0.0
Et=x.7  AQ~~~4 47  40c  .02  40  40  -0  0  40  403  40
P0oO I,o0
0
. 3  .02  40.  41l  0.0  020  -01  41i  020  0.0
U.I.co0o~~~~~~~~~~~~~0' ~~~~43  44  - .0  . 2  AD  .0.3  .02  .03  40  .0 3
b~~~~~oo,Z1  4~~~~~~~~~~~~~4  40O  44  -023  .014  -02.  -02.  -0.4  .74  .0.0
Fc.d  _0~~~~~~3  0.0  402  -03  410A1  -034l0
F!a.d  f=d  ~~~~~00  0.1  0 1  0  0  0 1  01  -001  -0.11  0.1;  -0.1
CC  4)40037  MI  0.1  01  0 0  0 0  0.1  00  00  0.0  0 0
0~~~~~~oo317  4~~~~~~~~~~~~~03  43  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2  .02  -0.3  43  43.  -0.2
023 CocOlOc,  40  A7  40Z  -. 0  .023  -0.4  -04  403  432  42
Th404  4'=.3  44  4.3  -02  40  -0.2  -0.2  43  41  41i
76Table 5
Mlnl4MMPA: SImulation Results
5 Pemnt Cut In Unskilled Labor Payroll Tax Rate, Sales Tax Revenue Neutral
(Pecntae deviations from baseline, unless otherwise Indicated)
Periods
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
IRel Sector
Total  resources  00  . 03  -02  -0 2  0.2  -0 2  -02  -0 2  -0.2  -0 2
Gnms  domestic prduct  0 2  -01  0 0  0 0  -01  -01  -01  -01  -01  -01
Imporl of goodo  nd  NFS  -0 8  -1  5  -11  -10  -11  -12  -11  -11  -11  -11
Total  oupondiue  00  3  40.2  2  -02  -0 2  -02  -0 2  -02  -0 2
Total  nsumpbn  -0.2  403  -04  -05  -08  -05  -05  -05  -05  -05
Pdvalooonsumption  -0 3  -04  -0  5  -08  -07  -0 6  0 6  -05  - 6  -06
Publicon  suntion  00  00  00  00  0o0  0 0  00  00  0  D
Total  Ivestment  4  0  -2 0  -0  9  -04  -0 7  -0 8  -08  -07  -08  -0
Prnoto invetrlent  -0 8  -2 7  -12  -0 5  -09  -11  -1 0  -1 0  -1  0  -1 0
Public  investment  -0 3  3  -0 3  -0 3  -0 3  -0 3  -0 3  -0 2  -0.2  -0 2
Exportf  0goods and  NFS  14  1  5  1 4  13  1 3  13  1 3  1 3  1  3  1 2
External Sector 1%  of GDP)'
Cuffent account  05  08  05  05  08  06  06  08  08  07
Exports0ofgoods  ndNFS  03  04  03  03  03  03  03  03  03  03
imports  of goods  ad NFS  -02  - 2  -02  -02  02  -0 2  -02  2  -02  -0 2
Factor"Mones  00  0 0  0 0  -01  1  .01  01  -41  -02  -02
Capital  scuount  -0  -08  -05  -0 5  - -0 8  -08  -0 5  -0  6  -0 7
Prnvts bomToing  -0 5  -08  -05  -0  -0  8  -08  -0  6 -08  -0  6  -0 7
PubUcbonro*g  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Ooornmrvnt Soctor  1%  of GODP)'
Totarevenuoe  00  00  00  0  00  00  00  00  00  00
olecttufts  -01  -01  -01  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
lndbmdtaxoS  00  01  01  00  0 1  01  01  01  01  01
Totl  exoendiure  -01  0 0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  00
Consumption  000  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Invesotnt  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  0  0 0  00
Tronsfer  to  households  00  0 0  00  0  0  0  O  O  O  0  0  0  o  00  00
Foreign  Interel  paymnt  0 0  0 0  O  00  0 0  0  0  0  0  0 0  00  a  0
Totalfinancing  00  0  00  00  00  00  00  0D  0 0  0 
Fonoin finndno  00  0 0  0  0  0 0  0 0  0  0  0  0  0 0  0 0  00 
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Labor MarWet
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Private  formal edor
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Public  sactor
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Employment
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Prtuote  fomrn  sector
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Capfalist end rn)oem  oags rota'  8 0  38  52  83  81  50  80  81  81  81
Absoalul  deviation  from base  foe 'rel  tanra
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78Table 7
Mini-IMMPA:  Simulation Results
5 Percent Cut in Unskilled Labor Payroll Tax Rate, Income Tax Revenue Neutral
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise  Indicated)
Periods
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
Real  Sector
Toalresources  01  -02  00  01  00  -01  -01  00  00  -01
Gmoss  domes0c product  0 3  0 0  01  0 2  01  0 0  01  01  0 1  0 0
importsofgoodsandNFS  -06  -14  -09  -04  -07  .10  -09  -07  -07  -04
Total expenditure  01  -0  0 0  01  00  -01  -01  00  00  -01
Total ens.mp005  00  0 3  0 2  -0 3  -04  -0 2  -01  -02  -0 3  -0 2
Pnvn1e  consumption  0 0  0 3  0 2  -0 3  -0 5  -0 2  -01  -02  -0 3  -0 3
Public consumption  0 0  0 0  00  0 0  0  00  00  00  00  00
Total mvestment  -0  -3 6  -21  0 3  -01  -1 5  -16  -0 7  -0 5  -1 0
Pd3ate Imnnstment  -0 9  4  -2 7  0 6  01  -1 9  -2 0  -0 8  -0 5  -12
Public lvstmenlt  -0 6  -0 9  -0 6  -0 4  -0 5  - 7  -0 6  -0 5  -0 5  -0 6
Epoertsof  ood1andNFS  14  15  13  12  13  13  13  12  1.2  13
Eatt3mal  Sector I%  of GOP)'
Curentaccount  04  06  05  04  05  06  06  05  05  06
Exports of goods and NFS  0 3  0 3  0 3  0 2  0 3  0 3  0 3  0 3  0 3  0 3
ImportsofgoodssndNFS  -01  -03  -02  -01  -01  -02  -02  -01  -01  -02
Factor srvles  0 0  0 0  0 0  -01  -01  -01  -01  -01  -01  -0 2
Capital account  -0 4  -0 6  -0 5  -0 4  -0 5  -0 6  -0 6  -0 5  -0 5  -0 6
Pn,ate bomownng  -04  -0 6  -0 5  -0 4  -06  -0  6  -0 6  -0 5  -0 5  -0 6
Public bOTomlng  00  0  0  0 0  0 0  00  00  00  00  00  0 
Govemment Sector (%  of ODP)'
Total  -evenue  -01  0 0  00  0 0  00  00  0  00  00  00
Directtaaes  03  04  03  03  03  04  04  03  03  03
Indirect  taxes  -04  -05  -04  -03  -03  -04  -04  -03  -03  -03
Total eopendlture  -01  -01  -01  01  -01  00  -01  -01  -01  00
Consumption  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Investment  -01  -01  -01  0 0  0 0  0 0  00  00  0  00
Transfe  rsto households  0  0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0
Ftregn lntest paymens  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0  0  0 0  O  0  0  0  00
Totalfinancing  00  -01  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Foreignfinanang  0  0  0a  0  0  0  0 0  00  00  00  00  0 
DomesUc  bomowing  00  -01  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  00  00  00  0
Laerw  Market
Nominal  wages
Aglalturl  secter  14  12  1 1  06  03  04  06  05  03  03
InforIsalsevtor  17  2 7  2 0  14  19  2 3  21  18  18  2 0
Prlete formal se.tr,
UnsltlIed  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
SOIled  -1 4  -2 3  -1 a  -1 1  -14  -1 6  -1 7  -1 5  -1 5  -1 6
Public sector
Unsdiled  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Skilled  00  01  01  00  00  01  01  00  00  00
Emptloyment
Agrdulnral  sector  00  0  0  0  0  0 1  01  01  0 1  0 1  01  01
Informal sector  0 0  -0 2  -01  -0 2  -0 4  -0 4  -0 3  -0 3  -0 3  -0 4
Pn,ate formal sector
Unshiled  35  2.2  31  41  36  30  31  35  36  33
skiled  -01  -0 2  -0 2  -01  01  -02  -02  -0 1  -01  -0 2
Public  soctor
Unskiled  0 0  0  00  0  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Sidled  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Labor supply (urban formal sector)
Unskilled  00  07  01  05  13  13  09  08  11  12
Skiled  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00
Unsmploy,unet rate  (urban  ornmal  sector)'
Unskilled  -2 3  -0  8  -2 0  -2 2  -13  -0  8  -13  -16  -14  -1 1
StDred  01  01  01  01  01  01  01  01  01  01
Real wage dfferentials '
Expected urba-n-nral (%  rf  ml Wale)  0  0  -15  -0 9  -1 1  -0  -01  -0 1  -0 3  -0  3  -0 1
E.pected tormol-lfrml(% of  Ilnfomal  wage)  0 0  1 9  -1 6  1 1  21  01  -1 1  -0 2  0 7  0 3
Migrabon '
Rural-urban (%  of urban lbor supply)  0 00  -0 01  -0 01  -0 01  -0 01  0 00  0 00  0 00  00  0 00
Formal-mfonmal (%  oftfnnal urban labor  supply)  000  0  71  -06 1  0 38  0 77  0 02  -039  -006  0 24  011
Memorandum  Item '
GDPatmarket pnces  02  00  01  02  01  00  00  01  01  00
Value added at  factor  ost  0 2  01  01  0 2  01  01  01  01  01  01
Valw added In ual  ector  0  0  00  0  0  0  1  01  01  01  01  0  1  01
Value  added m urban  informal setor  0 0  -0 2  0 0  -01  -0  3  -0 3  -0  2  -0  2  -0 3  -0  3
Vaiue  addedm urban fmmal sector  0  7  0  4  0 4  0 8  0 5  0  4  0  4  0 5  0 5  0 5
Pm,ate  Consumption  -0  3  -01  -01  6  -0  7  -0  5  -0 4  -05  -06  -0  6
Pnote Investment  -0 3  -4 0  -21  1 1  0 7  -12  -13  -0 3  0 0  -0 6
Dlsposable  inctme  01  -0 2  0 0  01  0 0  -01  0 0  01  01  0 0
Capiartslr and  nlenra  sann9s rts'  3 9  -0 5  1  3  5  61  3 8  3 3  4 7  5 3  4 7
'Absolute deviaton fmm bas  line 'rMal terms
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